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Personal Jurisdiction and National 
Sovereignty 
Ray Worthy Campbell* 
Abstract  
 
State sovereignty, once seemingly sidelined in personal 
jurisdiction analysis, has returned with a vengeance. Driven by the 
idea that states must not offend rival states in their jurisdictional 
reach, some justices have looked for specific targeting of individual 
states as individual states by the defendant in order to justify an 
assertion of personal jurisdiction. To allow cases to proceed based 
on national targeting alone, they argue, would diminish the 
sovereignty of any state that the defendant had specifically targeted. 
This Article looks for the first time at how this emphasis on 
state sovereignty limits national sovereignty, especially where alien 
defendants are involved. By requiring an antecedent “top of mind” 
focus on the forum state when actions that lead to litigation are 
taken, the Court would exclude from U.S. litigation activities that 
bear a close relationship to the forum and that would provide a 
basis for jurisdiction in many, if not most, other nations. This 
matters especially because the U.S. conducts so much of its national 
regulation through litigation in state courts and through litigation 
based on state causes of action. This Article gives fresh emphasis to 
the notion that states are members of a shared sovereignty, and that 
state actions implicate national sovereignty as much as actions by 
the federal branch of government. 
The problem is compounded by the incoherency of the Court’s 
“our federalism” state sovereignty analysis. Other commentators 
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have not focused on how the Court’s assumption in recent personal 
jurisdiction cases that states are in purely rivalrous relationships 
contrasts with reality, which is increasingly recognized to involve 
overlapping, reinforcing, sometimes coordinated spheres of 
jurisdiction. Rather than treating the states as rivals involved in a 
zero-sum game, where an assertion of power by one undercuts the 
power and dignity of another, this Article looks at the polycentric, 
pluralistic nature of U.S. governance, where state members of a 
“more perfect union” coordinate, collaborate, pursue shared goals 
independently, and only sometimes compete. 
State sovereignty ultimately is national sovereignty. To 
exaggerate concepts of state rivalry and exclusiveness in a modern 
age of legal pluralism serves only to diminish the regulatory reach 
of individual states, and, ultimately, the nation as a whole. The 
Court’s narrow focus on sovereignty threatens to make the scope of 
U.S. jurisdiction far narrower than that of other nations, and by 
Constitutionalizing that scope to make adjustments in rapidly 
changing circumstances difficult. 
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I. Introduction  
State sovereignty, once seemingly sidelined in personal 
jurisdiction analysis, has returned with a vengeance. Driven by the 
idea that states must not infringe upon the territorial sovereignty 
of sister states when asserting personal jurisdiction, some Justices 
have looked for proof that the defendant targeted a state 
individually and specifically, and not as part of a group, in order to 
justify an assertion of personal jurisdiction.1 To do otherwise, they 
argue, would diminish whichever other state the plaintiff chose to 
have a direct relationship with.2 In some cases, the targeting has 
not been found.3 The Court applies this logic even when the 
defendant is foreign, and despite targeting of the nation as a whole 
by a foreign defendant.4 Cases with a close connection to forum 
state compensatory and regulatory interests have been dismissed.5 
                                                                                                     
 1. See infra notes 147–157 and accompanying text.  
 2. See J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884 (2011) 
(reasoning that “each State has a sovereignty that is not subject to unlawful 
intrusion by other States”).  
 3. See id. at 886 (finding that petitioner did not engage in conduct 
purposefully directed at New Jersey).  
 4. See id. (“[I]t is petitioner’s purposeful contacts with New Jersey, not with 
the United States, that alone are relevant.”).  
 5.  For example, in Nicastro the plurality acknowledged New Jersey’s 
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The problem is that this emphasis on state sovereignty limits 
national sovereignty, at least where alien defendants are 
involved.6 By requiring an antecedent “top of mind” focus on the 
forum state when actions that lead to litigation are taken, the 
Court can exclude from U.S. litigation—and hence from U.S. 
after-the-fact regulation via litigation—activities that bear a close 
relationship to the forum and that would provide a basis for 
jurisdiction in many, if not most, other nations.7 
The problem is compounded by the incoherency of the Court’s 
“our federalism” analysis.8 If the Court is serious about “our 
federalism,” the analysis employed must focus realistically on how 
our government actually functions under the Constitution. First, 
rather than looking at states as unconnected sovereigns, the 
analysis should take into account that states are members of a 
shared sovereignty, and that state actions implicate national 
sovereignty as much as actions by the federal branch of 
government.9 Next, rather than treating the states as rivals 
                                                                                                     
strong interest in protecting its citizens, 564 U.S. at 887, and the dissent argued 
that, of all states, New Jersey’s connections made it the best suited state for trial 
of the matter, 564 U.S. at 898. 
 6. See William S. Dodge & Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aliens, 
116 MICH. L. REV. 1205, 1208 (2018) (arguing for a reconsideration of the 
conventional personal jurisdiction approach to alien defendants).  
 7. See id. at 1239 (“[I]t is unclear why a particular state could not 
legitimately exercise jurisdiction on behalf of the United States based on national 
contacts.”).  
 8. “Our federalism” most often is used to refer to the distribution of power 
and responsibilities between the states and the federal government. See Younger 
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (explaining that Our Federalism is grounded in 
“the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their 
institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate 
ways”). In the recent personal jurisdiction cases, the Court uses “our federalism” 
to discuss sovereignty conflicts amongst states, but without engaging in an 
analysis of the horizontal federalism issues involved. See infra Part III. 
 9. See David Brian Robertson, Federalism and American Political 
Development, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT 346 (Richard M. Valelly et al. eds., 2016) (“The framers resolved 
these conflicts with a series of political compromises that required the national 
government and the states to share government sovereignty. James Madison 
described this system as ‘partly federal, partly national’ or as a ‘compound 
republic.’” (emphasis in original)); VINCENT OSTROM & BARBARA ALLEN, THE 
POLITICAL THEORY OF A COMPOUND REPUBLIC: DESIGNING THE AMERICAN 
EXPERIMENT 88 (3d ed. 2008) (illustrating that the form of government is a 
collaborative one “by which several smaller states agree to become members of a 
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involved in a zero sum game, where an assertion of power by one 
undercuts the power and dignity of another, the Court should 
recognize the polycentric, pluralistic nature of U.S. governance, 
where state members of a “more perfect union” coordinate, 
collaborate, pursue shared goals independently, and only 
sometimes compete.10 Finally, while there are legitimate 
horizontal federalism concerns to consider even in a pluralistic 
state, the analysis employed should look directly and sensitively to 
those concerns, rather than letting the antecedent state of mind of 
a defendant control.11 
II. Personal Jurisdiction and Regulatory Scope over Aliens 
Personal jurisdiction matters.12 Jurisdiction unlocks the 
power of courts to adjudicate.13 More than in most world 
jurisdictions, in the United States the power to adjudicate 
translates to the power to regulate.14 Much U.S. regulation takes 
place through after-the-fact litigation.15 Since the power to 
                                                                                                     
larger one” (emphasis in original)).  
 10. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 868 
(2006)  
Ongoing debates over federalism, for example, seem trapped in 
unnecessarily binary conceptions of the vertical allocation of power. 
Yet, a third way for the resolution of federalism questions—and one 
more closely comporting with the realities of day-to-day 
governance  — might well be found in the overlap and dependence of 
intersystemic and dialectical regulation. 
 11. See Allan Erbsen, Reorienting Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine Around 
Horizontal Federalism Rather than Liberty After Walden v. Fiore, 19 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 769, 786 (2015) (“The problem is that the Court is trying to squeeze 
a ‘which governments’ federalism question into the framework of individual 
rights, where it does not fit comfortably and creates confusion.”). 
 12. See Austen Parrish, Personal Jurisdiction: The Transnational Difference, 
59 VA. J. INT’L L. 97, 100 (2019) (describing personal jurisdiction as “one of the 
doctrinal plains upon which broader and more salient debates related to global 
governance, international law, and sovereign authority are waged”).  
 13. See Jurisdiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining 
jurisdiction as a “court’s power to decide a case or issue a decree”).  
 14. See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND 
PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (2010) (noting that American civil 
litigation “contrast[s] sharply with European practices”).  
 15. See id. (“[I]mplementation of regulatory commands through private 
lawsuits can effectively encourage and induce compliance behavior by the 
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regulate, and the accompanying power to protect citizens and 
markets, is an important element of sovereignty, cutting off 
jurisdiction can limit sovereignty.16 Personal jurisdiction can only 
be understood in the context of the broader regulatory setting. 
A. After-the-Fact Regulation 
In the U.S. system, litigation plays a special role, far broader 
than resolving disputes between individual parties.17 To some, the 
U.S. seems to have a relatively weak regulatory capacity.18 In 
reality, taking into account the broader nature of what constitutes 
regulation, much of the regulatory work of both state and federal 
governments takes place through the judicial system.19 
As one scholar has put it: “What is distinctive about the United 
States is the extent to which we regulate not entry but 
consequences. There is a significant difference between an 
unregulated market and a deregulated market featuring low entry 
costs but careful scrutiny after the fact.”20 In some cases, this 
after-the-fact regulation has been the result of deliberate choices 
                                                                                                     
regulated population . . . .”).  
 16. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 324–25 (Black, J., 
concurring) (stressing the importance of states’ ability to exercise judicial 
authority). 
 17. See Alexandra D. Lahav, The Roles of Litigation in American Democracy, 
65 EMORY L.J. 1657, 1660 (2016) (“Litigation is often conflated with dispute 
resolution and law declaration (or adjudication), but it has its own independent 
contribution to make to the American system of government.”).  
 18. See FARHANG, supra note 14, at 19–59 (examining the relationship 
between the United States’s weak administrative state and its large private 
enforcement regime); Colin D. Moore, Bureaucracy and the Administrative State, 
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 328 (Richard 
M. Valelly et al. eds., 2016) (“Compared to the robust and centralized states of 
France and Germany, America’s bureaucracies appeared stunted, 
undistinguished, and strangely impotent.”). 
 19. See FARHANG, supra note 14, at 6 (“‘Regulation,’ as used here, to borrow 
a definition from Christopher Foreman, refers to ‘any governmental effort to 
control behavior by other entities, including small business firms, subordinate 
levels of government, or individuals.’”). See generally ROBERT BALDWIN, MARTIN 
CAVE & MARTIN LODGE, UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY, AND 
PRACTICE (2d ed. 2012). 
 20. Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 
377 (2007). 
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by legislatures.21 Private rights of action have been created as 
integral parts of new regulatory programs, enabling individual 
litigants to enforce the regulatory demands.22 In other cases, as 
with the tort system, it has arisen from the country’s common law 
tradition, but often interacting with statutes which may define 
duties or adjust incentives to litigate.23 
This system—described as “adversarial legalism”—shifts to 
the court system governance issues that in other countries may be 
handled through bureaucratic structures.24 This approach vests 
private parties, acting through their lawyers and the courts, with 
an important regulatory role.25 The courts, in short, are a vital part 
                                                                                                     
 21. See Thomas F. Burke, The Rights Revolution Continues: Why New Rights 
Are Born (and Old Rights Rarely Die), 33 CONN. L. REV. 1259, 1259–60 (2001) 
(“[T]hough the origins of regulation by litigation are usually traced to avaricious 
trial lawyers and ambitious attorneys general, in fact, regulation by litigation has 
deep roots in the structure of American government and American political 
culture.”). 
 22. See FARHANG, supra note 14, at 3 (“The existence and extent of private 
litigation enforcing a statute is to an important degree the product of legislative 
choice over questions of statutory design.”). 
 23. See Stephan Landsman, Juries as Regulators of Last Resort, 55 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1061, 1064 (2014) (tracing the role of juries as regulators in 
common law settings and arguing that new torts, such as insurance bad faith, 
empower juries to address regulatory gaps in the modern era); David Zaring, 
National Rulemaking Through Trial Courts: The Big Case and Institutional 
Reform, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1015, 1038 (2004) (viewing institutional reform 
lawsuits as nodes of a national network that develop and spread best practice 
standards nationally).  
 24. See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF 
LAW 47 (2003) (“In sum, whereas European polities generally rely on 
hierarchically organized national bureaucracies to hold local officials accountable 
to national policies, the U.S. Congress mobilized a distinctly American army of 
enforcers—a decentralized, ideologically motivated array of private advocacy 
groups and lawyers.”); Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Class Actions and 
the Counterrevolution Against Federal Regulation, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1496 
(2017) (“Research in multiple disciplines has established that the role of litigation 
and courts in the creation and implementation of public policy in the United 
States has grown dramatically.”); Richard L. Marcus, Reining In the American 
Litigator: The New Role of American Judges, 27 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
3, 7 (2003) (“A final feature of the American experience that bears on this overall 
picture of the crusading pursuer of right is the distinctive American reliance on 
private enforcement of public norms.”). See also Landsman, supra note 23, at 1107 
(arguing that court-made torts fill regulatory gaps). 
 25. See Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private 
Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 648–61 (2013) (analyzing the 
structure of private enforcement); J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private 
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of the governance process.26 As one scholar has noted: The United 
States more often relies on lawyers, legal threats, and legal 
contestation in implementing public policies, compensating 
accident victims, striving to hold governmental officials 
accountable, and resolving business disputes.27  
The role of the courts and litigation in policy making goes 
beyond federal programs such as employment discrimination and 
civil rights, although these are important and a large source of 
federal judicial business.28 In state courts as well as federal courts, 
the role of the courts reaches regulation of product safety, 
protection of the financial markets, and protection of the public 
health.29 As summarized by one leading procedural scholar: 
The efforts of public interest attorneys go well beyond the 
classic civil rights and legislative reapportionment battles. 
Asbestos is held in check by the private bar. Tobacco is cabined 
by the private bar. Defective pharmaceuticals such as diet 
drugs, Vioxx, and other products are removed from our midst. 
Illicit financial and market practices of companies such as 
Enron are halted by the private bar. Today, a number of 
attempts are underway to hold accountable some of those 
responsible for the recent financial crisis. Fewer Americans die 
or become incapacitated by defective products or toxic 
substances, and important social and economic policies are 
enforced because of the work of these lawyers.30 
                                                                                                     
Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1217 
(2012) (“[T]here is a decidedly public dimension, both structural and functional, 
to private regulation of wrongdoing.”); but see STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN 
FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST 
FEDERAL LITIGATION 2–3 (2017) (examining conservative counterrevolution 
implemented through courts against private enforcement). 
 26. See KAGAN, supra note 24, at 5 (describing litigation “not merely as a 
method of solving legal disputes but as a mode of governance”).  
 27. Id. at 110–11. 
 28. See FARHANG, supra note 14, at 3 (noting that job discrimination lawsuits 
are generally one of the largest categories of litigation in federal courts).  
 29. See Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, 
and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 291 (2013) (illustrating the “tremendous range” of matters 
resolved through litigation).  
 30. Id. at 299–300. 
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1. Regulation Through Deterrence 
The net of all this is that the American governance and 
regulation system relies on litigation in a way not common in other 
countries.31 Functions are shifted from bureaucratic agencies to 
the courts.32 This works, in theory and practice, because 
participants in the American system recognize that they can be 
held to account through litigation, and so modify their behavior in 
order to avoid legal damages.33 
This deterrence function does not, of course, take place with 
the mathematical rigor of the simplified economic models, but it 
does take place.34 Intermediaries such as corporate compliance 
departments and insurance underwriters play a role in translating 
legal requirements into behavioral norms.35 
                                                                                                     
 31. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. For a detailed comparative 
discussion in one setting, see Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman, 
Perspectives on Policy: Introduction, in REGULATING TOBACCO 3 (Robert L. Rabin 
& Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2001). 
 32. See KAGAN, supra note 24, at 3 (explaining that the United States “relies 
on adversarial legalism far more than other economically advanced 
democracies”).  
 33. See Lahav, supra note 17, at 1658 (explaining that the regulatory 
function of litigation causes “individuals and organizations [to] anticipate or learn 
from the results adjudication and adjust their behavior accordingly”); see also 
FARHANG, supra note 14, at 8–9 
Studies have found, ranging across such policy domains as job 
discrimination, sexual harassment, labor, playground safety, 
antitrust, and police brutality, that implementation of regulatory 
commands through private lawsuits can effectively encourage and 
induce compliance behavior by the regulated population, whether they 
be private entities or governmental subunits. The findings have 
established both “specific deterrence” and “general deterrence” effects, 
where specific deterrence refers to the effects of enforcement against a 
particular violator on that violator’s future conduct, while general 
deterrence refers to effects of visible enforcement efforts in the legal 
environment on other would-be violators who have yet to actually be 
the targets of enforcement, and hope never to be. 
 34. See KAGAN, supra note 24, at 16 (describing the American court system 
as “extremely inefficient”).  
 35. See id. at 130–31 (explaining how the U.S. tort law system operates as a 
“collective responsibility/social insurance model” which dictates to what extent 
and by whom victims of harm are compensated).  
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2. Litigation as Creating Legal Rules 
Litigation provides more than just deterrence.36 In the U.S., 
with its common law tradition, litigation directly leads to new 
laws.37 As higher courts decide issues raised in litigation, those 
decisions become binding precedent, confining the actions of lower 
courts and later editions of the same court.38 As a result, the 
development of U.S. legal doctrine depends directly on the flow of 
cases.39  
3. Compensation in the Place of Social Insurance 
Operating without the kind of pervasive governmental health 
insurance and welfare net common in some Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (O.E.C.D.) countries, the 
U.S. turns to litigation for compensation when individuals are 
injured.40 With government benefits comparatively scant, 
payments from those who caused the injury help fill the gap.41 This 
also represents a governmental interest that is addressed through 
litigation rather than other governmental means.42 
4. Regulation Through Litigation as More Favorable to Rapid 
Innovation 
Litigants in the U.S. moan, unsurprisingly, about the burdens 
of regulatory litigation, but in doing so pass by the benefits that 
                                                                                                     
 36. See Lahav, supra note 17, at 1658 (explaining that litigation is typically 
understood as serving more than one function).  
 37. See id. (describing litigation as “a system for law declaration”).  
 38. See FARHANG, supra note 14, at 3–4 (discussing, for example, how private 
lawsuits shaped the legal landscape of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).   
 39. See id. at 4 (noting that legislators deliberately choose to delegate their 
lawmaking authority to the courts).  
 40. See KAGAN, supra note 24, at 126, 130 (comparing the U.S. regime for 
compensating injured persons with those in the Netherlands and New Zealand).  
 41. See id. at 126 (describing the process in which a worker harmed by 
asbestos can bring a tort suit and obtain money damages for pain and suffering).  
 42. See id. at 127 (“In the early 1980s Congress considered but failed to 
create a fund that would compensate asbestos victims without the need for costly 
civil litigation.”).  
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accrue from shifting regulation to an ex post facto basis.43 
Compared to many other countries, the U.S. imposes lower upfront 
barriers to market entry.44 Legal entities such as corporations can 
be quickly formed; products can be brought to market with no 
regulatory approval in a wide range of settings.45 
In other jurisdictions, entry into markets can be more actively 
controlled.46 A country might only allow companies to be publicly 
listed after approval by a government ministry,47 or might control 
private activity through direct intervention by government 
bureaucrats.48 The U.S. engages to some degree in this kind of 
regulation—notably with regard to drugs and medical 
devices — but compared to other countries, it relies much more on 
private litigants to bring lawsuits which serve as after-the-fact 
regulation when problems arise.49 For example, rather than 
                                                                                                     
 43. See Issacharoff, supra note 20, at 382 (highlighting the indispensable 
role of private litigation in ex post accountability).  
 44. See id. at 377 (dubbing the United States as “Exhibit A” in terms of 
relaxed market entry).  
 45. See id. at 376–77 (explaining that when a government removes barrier 
to entry, it “is well advised to interfere minimally with privately generated 
growth”). 
 46. See id. at 375 (“Prior to Putin-era reforms, for example, a typical business 
in Russia needed to acquire between 300 and 500 different permits before 
opening.”).  
 47. See Chen Yang & Zhi Bin, China, in THE INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS 
LAW REVIEW 24 (David J. Goldschmidt ed., 3d ed. 2019) 
IPO listings in China are subject to regulatory approval by the CSRC 
[China Railway Signal & Communication Corp.]. Therefore, the 
approval system in China differs from the registration system in Hong 
Kong, the United States and other capital markets. The CSRC 
determines whether a prospective issuer provided accurate and 
adequate disclosure in accordance with listing requirements. In 
practice, applicants may face long waiting periods (sometimes two to 
three years or even more), due to administrative backlog and repeated 
requests for information. 
 48. See FARHANG, supra note 14, at 6–7 (describing the Weberian ideal of the 
modern state, which measures state capacity by bureaucratic size and 
involvement, as the traditional understanding of a “strong state”).  
 49. See Issacharoff, supra note 20, at 382 (“[T]he idea that a sufficient level 
of state or federal regulation could effectively displace private litigation is almost 
inconceivable.”); Landsman, supra note 23, at 1062–64 (explaining how litigation 
addresses regulatory gaps caused by regulatory capture or political influence); 
Steven A. Ramirez, The Virtues of Private Securities Litigation: An Historic and 
Macroeconomic Perspective, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 669, 674–75 (2014) (noting 
regulatory value of private securities litigation).  
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requiring active up or down approval before a company can go 
public or a potentially unsafe product can be sold, enforcement is 
substantially shifted to the courts if and when a problem arises.50 
In order to make this practical, private litigants are given 
investigatory and factual exploration powers that in other 
countries are given only to government agencies.51 This approach 
calculates that companies faced with the cost of such suits will 
engage in voluntary self-regulation, and so be deterred from 
unreasonably dangerous activities.52 
This preference for after-the-fact regulation provides many 
significant advantages in today’s economy.53 Innovation can 
proceed at the speed of the most innovative businesses, rather than 
being held to the pace of government bureaucracies.54 To enter a 
market costs less, given the absence of required prior approvals, 
thus allowing the entry of innovators who might be kept out of the 
                                                                                                     
 50. See Patrick Luff, Risk Regulation and Regulatory Litigation, 64 
RUTGERS L. REV. 73, 75–76 (2011) (discussing the use of regulatory 
litigation — both statutory and litigant driven—to fill regulatory gaps). 
 51. See KAGAN, supra note 24, at 15 (explaining that the U.S. system 
deprives the government “of direct controls over the economy that, for good or for 
ill, many governments elsewhere in the world employ”).  
 52. See Issacharoff, supra note 20, at 379–81 (“The ex post regulatory model 
is premised on the idea that parties should be able to internalize the risk of 
liability—perhaps even for punitive damages—and regulate themselves 
accordingly.”).  
 53. See Burbank, Farhang, & Kritzer, supra note 25, at 662  
On the positive side of the ledger, relative to administrative 
implementation, private enforcement regimes can: (1) multiply 
resources devoted to prosecuting enforcement actions; (2) shift the 
costs of regulation off of governmental budgets and onto the private 
sector; (3) take advantage of private information to detect violations; 
(4) encourage legal and policy innovation; (5) emit a clear and 
consistent signal that violations will be prosecuted, providing 
insurance against the risk that a system of administrative 
implementation will be subverted; (6) limit the need for direct and 
visible intervention by the bureaucracy in the economy and society; 
and (7) facilitate participatory and democratic governance. 
See also Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The 
Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 107 
(2005) (discussing three salient advantages of private enforcement).  
 54. See Burbank, Farhang & Kritzer, supra note 25, at 664 (reasoning that 
private enforcement regimes encourage legal innovation because private litigants 
“are more likely to press for innovations in legal theories and strategies”).  
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market by the costs of entry in other systems.55 Time to market 
shrinks to the extent governmental processes are not part of the 
timeline, which can allow companies to seize first mover 
advantage.56 After-the-fact regulation can even diminish 
corruption, by removing gatekeepers who might demand payoffs 
before a market is opened.57 
Effective after-the-fact regulation does require, however, that 
litigation works as a check on behavior.58 If laws are not enforced 
or are only sporadically enforced through litigation, the regulatory 
grip is reduced.59 Personal jurisdiction thus can play a critical role 
in making sure that regulation through courts is effective.  
B. After-the-Fact Regulation of Aliens in The Age of Globalization 
In a globalized world, after-the-fact regulation can only be 
effective if companies selling into or otherwise impacting the U.S. 
can be held effectively to account through litigation. Narrow 
jurisdictional rules reduce the grip of the U.S. regulatory system 
on those whose behavior is sought to be regulated. This is 
aggravated when jurisdictional rules are readily manipulated—as 
when the analysis looks not to effects or foreseeable consequences, 
but to evidence of the defendant’s state of mind with regard to the 
forum at some time before the litigation arises. Defendants’ intent 
on avoiding exposure can endeavor to build a “purposeful 
availment” narrative that distances them from responsibility in 
the U.S., while benefiting fully from the U.S. market.60 
                                                                                                     
 55. See id. at 663 (noting that private enforcement regimes impose lower 
costs because legislators can implement policy at a lesser cost than with 
administrative implementation). 
 56. See Issacharoff, supra note 20, at 385 (showing how a private 
enforcement regime makes it easier to bring a product to market and makes the 
U.S an attractive place to do business).  
 57. See id. at 375 (noting that “heavier regulation of entry is generally 
associated with greater corruption”).  
 58. See Burbank, Farhang & Kritzer, supra note 25, at 667 (showing how 
private enforcement regimes can lead to fragmented and incoherent policy). 
 59.  See id. at 669 (“The legislative and executive branches have less 
continuing control over policy when private enforcement is relied on for 
implementation . . . .”).  
 60. See Peter Hay, Judicial Jurisdiction over Foreign-Country Corporate 
Defendants —  Comments on Recent Case Law, 63 OR. L. REV. 431, 433 (1984) 
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On the other hand, there are clear costs to unbridled 
regulatory reach. Excessive or “exorbitant” claims of power can 
cause conflict with other nations.61 In addition, opening the doors 
too widely can burden the U.S. courts with litigation in which the 
U.S. has little stake or interest.  
In recent years, the scope of U.S. personal jurisdiction has 
shrunk.62 While eliminating bases for legitimate concerns about 
exorbitant jurisdiction, it also raises concerns about whether U.S. 
jurisdiction remains broad enough to allow effective regulation to 
protect U.S. consumers and markets.63  
C. The Shrinking Reach of U.S. Personal Jurisdiction 
Not so long ago, the reach of U.S. personal jurisdiction was 
extremely broad, leading to a fair concern that the U.S. suffered 
from “exorbitant jurisdiction” that overreached.64 In recent years, 
however, the scope of U.S. personal jurisdiction against both 
domestic and foreign defendants has been dramatically 
narrowed.65 Coinciding with this, but not entirely driving it, has 
been a renewed emphasis on limits on state power, with concerns 
expressed by some justices that states not overstep and interfere 
                                                                                                     
(noting the possibility that foreign country defendant could structure activities to 
avoid jurisdiction through devices such as channeling all sales through local 
subsidiary or shipping F.O.B. foreign location); Janice Toran, Federalism, 
Personal Jurisdiction, and Aliens, 58 TUL. L. REV. 758, 773 (1984) (“[A]lien 
businesses may be able to structure their commercial dealings in the United Sates 
to avoid establishing sufficient contacts with any one state and thus to avoid 
jurisdiction in this country.”).  
 61. See Kevin M. Clermont & John R. Palmer, Exorbitant Jurisdiction, 58 
ME. L. REV. 473, 476 (explaining that identifying jurisdiction as exorbitant is “to 
condemn it as inappropriate from an international standpoint”).  
 62. See Michael H. Hoffheimer, The Stealth Revolution in Personal 
Jurisdiction, 70 FLA. L. REV. 499, 505 (2018) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s 
personal jurisdiction cases since 2011 constitute a “stealth” narrowing of personal 
jurisdiction). 
 63. Personal jurisdiction is just one doctrine that has changed in a way that 
limits U.S. regulatory reach. See generally Pamela Bookman, Litigation 
Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1081 (2015). 
 64. See generally Clermont & Palmer, supra note 61. 
 65. See Hoffheimer, supra note 62, at 502–03 (discussing how recent 
restrictions on jurisdiction have made it difficult for plaintiffs to find available 
courts).  
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with other states.66 Interestingly, even though some of the 
defendants in the landmark cases have been from outside the U.S., 
the Court has seemed to draw no operative distinction between 
domestic and foreign defendants.67 The net result has moved the 
U.S. to a place where its jurisdictional scope is narrower, not 
broader, than other countries, which is of special concern because 
the U.S. delegates so much more regulatory enforcement and law 
creation to its court system.68 
1. The Retreat from Exorbitant Jurisdiction 
Recent years have seen dramatic limitations on the scope of 
U.S. personal jurisdiction.69 Most clearly with regard to disputes 
that have no relation to the forum, but also to those with some 
connection to the forum, the Supreme Court has rolled back 
jurisdictional reach.70 
The rollback has not been complete, and in some limited ways 
the reach of U.S. courts goes beyond international norms.71 For 
example, the U.S. allows “tag” jurisdiction based on nothing more 
than the voluntary bodily presence of a human being in a 
jurisdiction, even if the dispute is otherwise utterly unrelated to 
the forum.72 The U.S. will also find consent to personal jurisdiction 
based on boilerplate forum selection clauses in form contracts of 
                                                                                                     
 66. See infra Part III.  
 67. See id. (“[T]he assumption seems to be that, so long as subject matter 
jurisdiction is present, alien defendants may be sued in the same manner as 
citizens in both state and federal courts.”). 
 68. See Hoffheimer, supra note 62, at 505 (arguing that the Court has 
exhibited “radical” changes in the area of personal jurisdiction).  
 69. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing recent restrictions 
on personal jurisdiction).  
 70. See Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 
(2017) (rejecting the California Supreme Court’s “sliding scale approach” for 
specific jurisdiction and explaining that “a defendant’s general connections with 
the forum are not enough” for specific jurisdiction).  
 71. See Clermont & Palmer, supra note 61, at 477 (“[C]ourts in the United 
States shock the world by asserting jurisdiction over a defendant based merely on 
the defendant’s transient physical presence.”). 
 72. See Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 610 (1990) (stating 
that personal jurisdiction can be established by service on a human being 
voluntarily present in the jurisdiction, despite a lack of minimum contacts). 
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adhesion, even when it seems certain that the term was not 
actively negotiated and most likely not actually read.73  
The practical, commercial scope of these remaining exceptions 
to high dollar, financially significant corporate settings is 
somewhat limited, however. Jurisdiction based on bodily presence 
does not apply to corporate defendants.74 Unread boilerplate 
consent clauses can apply to corporate defendants, but it seems 
less likely that consent will be imposed, unread, on corporations 
negotiating a significant transaction than on consumers making 
an online purchase.75 
a. The Narrowing of Dispute-Blind “General” Jurisdiction 
By way of contrast, the narrowing of dispute-blind “general 
jurisdiction” promises to have an enormous practical impact. Most 
U.S. personal jurisdiction relies on a “minimum contacts” test, 
which asks whether the defendant’s contacts with the jurisdiction 
are sufficient to allow jurisdiction to be asserted consistent with 
due process concerns.76 The contacts can be so systematic and 
continuous as to give rise to so-called “general jurisdiction,”77 
which allows assertion of personal jurisdiction against a corporate 
defendant even for disputes unrelated to the forum.78 More limited 
                                                                                                     
 73. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 596 (1991) 
(determining consent to exclusive forum in a form contract of adhesion upheld); 
see generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING 
RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 135–38 (2013). 
 74. See Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2014), 
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2310 (2015) (holding that personal jurisdiction cannot be 
obtained by service on an officer of a corporation who is present in the jurisdiction 
without minimum contacts for the corporation). 
 75. See RADIN, supra note 73, at 135 (noting that forum selection clauses in 
boilerplate are limited by the U.S. constitutional guarantee of due process). 
 76. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“[D]ue process 
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if 
he be not present within the territory of the forum, have certain minimum 
contacts with it . . . .”); see generally WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1067 (4th ed.). 
 77. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 
(2011) (“For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general 
jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, 
one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.”).  
 78. See id. at 919 (stating that for general jurisdiction, a court may hear any 
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contacts can give rise to so-called “specific jurisdiction,” which 
looks only to contacts related to the dispute at bar.79 
Not so long ago, many and probably most U.S. lawyers 
understood general jurisdiction to lie when a party had any 
substantial “systematic and continuous” contacts with the forum 
state.80 While the Supreme Court had provided little guidance on 
what might provide adequate contacts in this setting, litigants and 
judges apparently understood the test to be looking for exactly 
what the terms imply—systematic and continuous operations 
within the state.81 Because many large corporations have 
systematic and continuous operations at some level in many 
jurisdictions, the assertion of a personal jurisdiction defense by 
large, domestic companies was not often successfully asserted.82 
Under the understanding that governed for decades, a company 
that had operated a large factory in the forum state, or that 
maintained multiple offices that engaged in significant amounts of 
business, might be understood to be subject to general personal 
jurisdiction.83  
The practical impact of such a broad understanding was 
significant. General jurisdiction provides U.S. personal 
jurisdiction (and hence often a forum) for any dispute, worldwide, 
                                                                                                     
and all claims against the corporation). 
 79. See generally WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 76, at § 1067.5. 
 80. See Judy M. Cornett & Michael M. Hoffheimer, Good-Bye Significant 
Contacts: General Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 76 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 101, 104 (2015) (“Despite the Court’s assurance that its decisions are 
guided by tradition, Daimler departs from settled law under which corporations 
have been subject to jurisdiction for all claims in states where they maintained a 
sufficient permanent presence or engaged in a comparable substantial level of 
business.”). 
 81. See Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aggregation, 113 NW. U.L. 
REV. 1, 24 (2018) (“Prior to Goodyear, the common understanding was that 
companies doing substantial business in all fifty states—Daimler, Goodyear, 
Walmart, and the like—would have been subject to general jurisdiction in every 
state.”). 
 82. Often, it was not tried because of the seeming futility. See Cassandra 
Burke Robertson, Personal Jurisdiction in Legal Malpractice Litigation, 6 ST. 
MARY’S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 2, 15 (2016) (noting that under continuous and 
systematic standard many defendants did not challenge jurisdiction). 
 83. See Dodge & Dodson, supra note 6, at 1218–19 (“The test distilled from 
these two cases (and ‘taught to generations of first-year law students’) was that 
general jurisdiction could be based on ‘continuous and systematic general 
business contacts.’”). 
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where general jurisdiction can be established in the U.S.84 Even for 
domestic companies, general jurisdiction offers additional forum 
shopping opportunities, with more chances to find a locale hostile 
to the defendant.85 With globalization and the concentration of 
economic wealth in major corporations, a situation arose where 
many companies, domestic and foreign, engaged in systematic and 
continuous contacts in many locations, if not almost everywhere.86 
Because general jurisdiction requires no connection to the dispute 
itself, this meant for many companies, personal jurisdiction for 
disputes worldwide could be had in any number of U.S. locations.87  
The potential impact of such a broad understanding of general 
jurisdiction was to put pressure on the U.S. to become a default 
forum for any dispute, arising anywhere, that involved a defendant 
doing regular systematic and continuous business in the U.S.88 
While other doctrines such as forum non conveniens exist to limit 
the scope of U.S. judicial power in a given case,89 and statutes such 
as the Alien Tort Claims Act90 can be interpreted to limit statutory 
reach,91 even deciding whether to entertain such cases was a 
                                                                                                     
 84. See Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 
(2017) (“A court with general jurisdiction may hear any claim against that 
defendant, even if all the incidents underlying the claim occurred in a different 
State.” (emphasis in original)).  
 85. See Walter W. Heiser, Toward Reasonable Limitations on the Exercise of 
General Jurisdiction, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1035, 1037 (2004) (explaining that 
general jurisdiction offers plaintiffs the opportunity to forum shop to “capture the 
most favorable substantive law or statute of limitations”).  
 86. See Daimler AG v. Bauman 571 U.S. 117, 156 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (reasoning that today’s global economy has caused large corporations 
to feel “essentially at home” in multiple States).  
 87. See Friedrich K. Juenger, The American Law of General Jurisdiction, 
2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141, 159 (2001) (“The Supreme Court case law, the 
Restatements and the academic literature largely agree that foreign corporations 
doing a sufficient volume of business are subject to general in personam 
jurisdiction even though they are neither incorporated nor have their principal 
place of business within the forum state.”). 
 88. See Heiser, supra note 85, at 1037 (showing how general jurisdiction is 
controversial for international litigation where foreign defendants with contacts 
in the United States “fear they will be forced into a court in the United States”).  
 89. See id. at 1040–42 (discussing application of reasonableness branch of 
minimum contacts and forum non conveniens as factors limiting the reach of 
general jurisdiction). 
 90. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2018).  
 91. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 115 (2013) 
(applying a presumption against extraterritorial application). 
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potentially burdensome business for U.S. courts to be in. What’s 
more, the broad assertion of judicial power, subject only to 
prudential narrowing doctrines, put the U.S. in an exceptional 
position versus other sovereign nations, whose conceptions of 
jurisdiction generally were narrower than entertaining all claims, 
worldwide, against any company doing regular and substantial 
business in a jurisdiction.92 
The potential breadth of general jurisdiction was illustrated 
by the Court’s even choosing to hear and analyze at length the 
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall93 case rather 
than disposing of it by summary reversal. In this case, it is not 
remarkable that the court found that one trip to Texas by a foreign 
corporation’s chief executive officer, the acceptance of checks 
drawn on a Texas bank, the purchase of a helicopter and 
equipment from a Texas manufacturer, and related training trips 
did not rise to the level of systematic and continuous contacts 
required to create dispute blind personal jurisdiction for claims 
arising anywhere.94 Rather, what is remarkable is that the Court 
found it necessary to discuss for ten pages in the U.S. reports how 
close to the lines this scanty conduct was. Had the Court found 
general jurisdiction, similarly light contacts would have provided 
personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations on a dispute-blind 
basis for claims unrelated to those U.S. activities.  
In light of lower courts’ understanding of general jurisdiction 
at the time, however, Helicopteros was not as exceptional as it 
seemed in the post-Daimler era. Lower courts at that time had 
found general jurisdiction where companies had made multiple 
sales of rare coins to customers in the state,95 used the highways 
                                                                                                     
 92. This unusual breadth posed difficulties when an effort was made to reach 
an international treaty on recognizing judgments, which necessarily involved 
issues of appropriate jurisdiction. See Heiser, supra note 85, at 1037–38 (arguing 
that general jurisdiction became a major obstacle in negotiating treaty). 
 93. 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
 94. See id. at 418 (concluding that the defendant’s minimum contacts with 
the State did not allow the State court to assert personal jurisdiction for a claim 
not arising within that State).  
 95. See Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 231 S.E.2d 629, 633 (N.C. 1977) 
(finding jurisdiction over out-of-state defendant for sales to a then resident of 
South Carolina where it had solicited business in North Carolina and made 
$50,000 in sales); Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business With 
Doing-Business Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171, 176 (2001) (“Our courts 
have exercised general jurisdiction over defendants with no physical presence in 
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of the state in connection with a trucking business,96 operated a 
seven-employee office and had another employee who spent much 
of his working time in the state (all on activities unrelated to the 
claim),97 and where a rock promoter had run rock concerts in the 
state.98 Such decisions, which were not far outside the mainstream, 
went far toward making the U.S. at least jurisdictionally open to 
all kinds of claims worldwide.99 
The Court backed away from this problem by effectively 
rewriting the scope of general jurisdiction. Somewhat obscurely in 
Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, S.A. v. Brown,100 and then very 
explicitly in Daimler AG v. Bauman,101 the Court made clear that 
general jurisdiction was much narrower than the previous 
understanding. Rather than lying wherever systematic and 
continuous activities can be found, the Court explained, general 
jurisdiction lies only when a defendant can be said to be “at home” 
in the jurisdiction.102 The Court identified two situations where 
companies generally were at home.103 One was the state of 
incorporation, under whose laws the company’s existence 
                                                                                                     
the forum—whose only contacts are purchases from forum sellers, sales to forum 
customers through third parties, or even purchases by web site or mail 
order — sometimes using this same reciprocal benefits rationale.”). 
 96. See Carter v. Massey, 436 F. Supp. 29, 31 (D. Md. 1977) (asserting 
personal jurisdiction in Maryland over trucking company for accident in Delaware 
unrelated to any Maryland activities because the company, after the accident, had 
done trucking business in Maryland). 
 97. See St. Louis-S.F. Ry. v. Gitchoff, 369 N.E.2d 52, 53 (Ill. 1977) (discussing 
how defendant has a seven employees sales office plus one logistics employee who 
often worked in Illinois). 
 98. See North Dakota v. Newberger, 613 P.2d 1002, 1005 (Mont. 1980) 
(allowing suit in Montana for contract breach in North Dakota because California 
based concert promoter had held concerts in Montana). For more examples, see 
Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 
633 – 36 (1988). 
 99. As might be expected, such potentially broad assertions of jurisdiction 
were controversial internationally. See Heiser, supra note 85, at 1036 (“General 
jurisdiction [pre-Daimler] is particularly controversial in international litigation 
involving foreign defendants who do business in the United States.”). 
 100. 564 U.S. 915 (2011). 
 101. 571 U.S. 117 (2014).   
 102. See id. at 139 (concluding that the general jurisdiction did not exist 
where the defendant was not at home in California).  
 103. See id. (explaining the conditions for general jurisdiction of a corporate 
defendant). 
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derives.104 The second was the state where the company has its 
principal place of business.105 
The narrowing of the jurisdictional reach was made clear 
through the facts in Daimler, where no attempt had been made in 
the lower courts or at the Court itself to vigorously argue that 
general jurisdiction did not lie in California for Daimler’s U.S. 
subsidiary.106 Mercedes Benz automobiles have been a fixture in 
California virtually since the invention of the automobile, and 
various Daimler subsidiaries had maintained for generations 
extensive operations supporting substantial sales.107 Under the 
prior understanding of general jurisdiction, there is little question 
that the U.S. subsidiary would have qualified for general 
jurisdiction. Under Daimler, however, because neither its 
headquarters nor principal place of business were there, those 
actions did not suffice to create general jurisdiction even against 
the subsidiary.108 The Court left open the possibility of other 
settings for general jurisdiction, but the facts of Daimler make 
clear that the other settings will involve unusual if not unique 
circumstances.109 
Daimler has enormous practical impact. Prior to Goodyear and 
Daimler, the operating assumption of many lawyers was that 
personal jurisdiction, at least, would lie in any U.S. setting where 
the defendant had ongoing and significant operations—and 
perhaps even where the activities, like those in Helicopteros, were 
                                                                                                     
 104. See id. (noting that the defendants, Daimler and MBUSA, were not 
incorporated in California). 
 105. See id. (stating the defendant did not have its principal place of business 
in California and was therefore not amenable to suit there). While Daimler 
represented a shift within U.S. law, placing general jurisdiction where a 
defendant has its domicile has ancient roots, going back at least to Justinian’s 
code. See Juenger, supra note 87, at 143 (citing Justinian’s Code, cod 3.19.3, 
3.13.2). 
 106. See Daimler AG v. Bauman 571 U.S. 117, 143 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (discussing how the defendant conceded that the California courts 
could exercise general jurisdiction over its U.S. subsidiary). 
 107. See id. at 123 (stating that the defendant “is the largest supplier of 
luxury vehicles to the California market”). 
 108. See supra notes 101–105 and accompanying text (discussing the 
requirements for general jurisdiction over a corporation). 
 109. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 (reasoning that general jurisdiction could 
exist where the corporation’s contacts with a State are so substantial that it is 
essentially at home).  
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much slimmer. Today, as a practical matter, general jurisdiction is 
likely to be found only in two locations—in the state under whose 
law a corporation is created, and in the state where it maintains 
its headquarters.110 
In many cases—and in all cases involving foreign 
defendants—this shifts the inquiry away from whether a 
corporation maintains a regular presence in a state to whether 
specific contacts related to the litigation can be found.111 In many 
garden variety settings, a different result can be obtained. For 
example, prior to Daimler, personal jurisdiction could be expected 
to lie against any bank conducting regular business in financial 
centers such as New York, enabling both the attachment of assets 
and the initiation of discovery.112 After Daimler, general 
jurisdiction lies only in the state of incorporation and the principal 
place of business.113 For an alien, neither of those locations will be 
within the U.S., and so general jurisdiction will never apply.114 
The Gucci litigation provides a concrete example of where this 
could happen.115 In Gucci, the claim was that a Chinese company 
                                                                                                     
 110. See supra notes 107–109 and accompanying text (discussing the 
requirements for general jurisdiction over a corporate defendant). 
 111. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977) (“[T]he relationship 
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation . . . became the central concern 
of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction.”). 
 112. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) (“[T]here have 
been instances in which continuous corporate operations within a state were 
thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes 
of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”). 
 113. See supra notes 107–108 and accompanying text (discussing general 
jurisdiction of a corporate defendant under Daimler).  
 114. See Cassandra Burke Robertson & Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, A 
Shifting Equilibrium: Personal Jurisdiction, Transnational Litigation, and the 
Problem of Nonparties, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 643, 646 (2015) (addressing 
the importance of the issue in transnational litigation and arguing for a broader 
specific jurisdiction analysis against nonparties such as foreign banks in such 
situations, balanced with comity concerns with regard to interests of the foreign 
jurisdiction). 
 115. See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No. 10 Civ. 4974(RJS), 2011 WL 
6156936, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011) (arguing that bank account information 
in China could be subpoenaed because the bank has United States branches that 
transfer money between branches in New York and China); see also Gucci Am., 
Inc. v. Weixing Li, No. 10 Civ. 4974(RJS), 2012 WL 5992142, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 
15, 2012) (concluding that the Bank of China was held in civil contempt for failing 
to produce documents relating to bank accounts in China following a court order 
to do so).  
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was engaged in trademark violations that were enabled by the 
bank’s processing of payments.116 Finding general jurisdiction, 
prior to Daimler, the district court required the Bank of China to 
produce banking records of the alleged infringer so as to reveal the 
scope of income potentially related to the trademark violations.117 
The District Court imposed heavy daily cash fines to ensure 
compliance, despite claims that compliance would violate Chinese 
law.118 
On appeal, the Second Circuit looked to Daimler, and found 
that general jurisdiction did not exist.119 It then remanded for a 
determination of whether specific jurisdiction could be 
demonstrated.120 On remand, the District Court found specific 
jurisdiction did lie, but the nature of the inquiry was different and 
depended on the specific facts.121 On similar facts involving two 
banks doing regular business in the local jurisdiction, the Seventh 
Circuit found that in the absence of Iranian assets in the 
jurisdiction neither general nor personal jurisdiction could be 
established so as to enforce a subpoena that would require the 
banks to reveal whether and where they held Iranian 
assets  — perhaps a different result than would have been likely 
before Daimler.122 
It is perhaps worth noting that a case such as Gucci in the 
post-Daimler era leaves plaintiffs with a harder task establishing 
personal jurisdiction than they would have had either in the 
                                                                                                     
 116. See Gucci, 2011 WL 6156936, at *1 (alleging that defendants were 
offering counterfeit versions of plaintiff’s products on the internet).  
 117. See id. at *13 (ordering the defendant to produce all information 
requested by the subpoena). 
 118. See Gucci, 2012 WL 5992142, at *7 (arguing that a party could still be 
held in contempt even if compliance could result in a violation of foreign law). 
 119. See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 135 (2d. Cir. 2014) 
(concluding that the district court may not exercise general personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant based on Daimler). 
 120. See id. at 138 (stating that the district court should develop a record 
sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction).  
 121. See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 135 F. Supp. 3d 87, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(concluding that exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant was 
reasonable and comported with due process).  
 122.  See Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 852 F.3d 687, 690 (7th Cir. 
2017) (finding that specific jurisdiction did not lie where banks in Chicago did not 
hold any assets of the Iranian government).  
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Pennoyer123 era or in most of the International Shoe124 era.125 
Under Pennoyer, quasi in rem jurisdiction could easily have been 
established over a bank with substantial assets in the 
jurisdiction,126 as well perhaps as “presence” through a “doing 
business” analysis of the kind that prevailed before International 
Shoe.127 After Shaffer v. Heitner,128 however, quasi in rem 
jurisdiction is functionally unavailable where there are no 
minimum contacts.  
After Daimler, general jurisdiction no longer provides a 
justification for claiming that the U.S. exercises exorbitant 
jurisdiction. With limited general jurisdiction and with a specific 
jurisdiction analysis that is more narrow than most other nations 
employ, the U.S. seems as narrow, if not more narrow, in its 
jurisdictional assertions than most other nations.129 
b. The Potential Narrowing of Specific Jurisdiction 
General jurisdiction is not the whole story, moreover. The 
court, less definitively, has also seemed to narrow the scope of 
specific jurisdiction, although fractured and fact bound holdings 
make the outcome less clear. For decades, the touchstone for 
specific, or dispute-related, personal jurisdiction has been whether 
                                                                                                     
   123.  Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
   124. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 125. It has been argued that minimum contacts analysis in general as 
currently applied gives states less ability to bring in out-of-state defendants than 
Pennoyer’s territorial model. See Cody J. Jacobs, In Defense of Territorial 
Jurisdiction, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1589, 1595 (2018) (“Second, I show that the 
post-Shoe era has not expanded the reach of personal jurisdiction and, instead, 
has contracted state power into a husk of what would have been available before 
Shoe.”). 
 126. See Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 227–28 (1905) (holding that the 
presence of intangible financial interest in state sufficient to establish quasi in 
rem jurisdiction). 
 127. See Phila. & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917) (“A 
foreign corporation is amenable to process . . . if it is doing business within the 
state in such manner and to such extent as to warrant the inference that it is 
present there.”). 
 128. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
 129. For a discussion of comparative jurisdictional regimes, see generally 
CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2015). 
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the defendant “purposefully availed” itself of a connection with the 
forum state.130 Situations where a connection with the forum were 
imposed upon the defendant are not enough;131 even when it is 
foreseeable that a company’s defective product might have ended 
up in the forum, courts have demanded more.132 
The J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro133 case illustrates this 
narrowing.134 In Nicastro, the plaintiff was injured by an industrial 
metal shredding machine at his workplace in New Jersey.135 No 
one disputed that New Jersey had an interest in regulating the 
safety of industrial machinery in its state, nor that New Jersey has 
                                                                                                     
 130. See, e.g., Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) (“In this case, 
petitioners are primary participants in an alleged wrongdoing intentionally 
directed at a California resident, and jurisdiction over them is proper on that 
basis.”); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984) (concluding 
personal jurisdiction existed where activities were purposefully directed at the 
state); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 482 (1985) (finding that the 
defendant purposefully availed himself of benefits of state’s laws). 
 131. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)  
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a 
nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with 
the forum State. The application of that rule will vary with the quality 
and nature of the defendant’s activity, but it is essential in each case 
that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself 
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus 
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. 
 132. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980) 
(noting that foreseeability “alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for 
personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause”). 
 133. 564 U.S. 873 (2011). 
 134. The Nicastro opinion has been much criticized by commentators. See, 
e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence 
of the Minimum Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1245 (2011) (calling 
the decision a “disaster”); Wendy Collins, What’s Sovereignty Got to Do with It? 
Due Process, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. REV. 729, 
729 (2012) (“[M]ay set a new low . . . .”); John N. Drobak, Personal Jurisdiction in 
a Global World: A Comment on the Supreme Court’s Recent Decisions in Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires and Nicastro, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1707, 1729 (2013) (“[T]he worst 
result in any personal jurisdiction case decided by the Supreme Court in the 
modern era.”); Allan Ides, Foreword: A Critical Appraisal of the Supreme Court’s 
Decision in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 341, 
345 (2012) (“[E]xacerbated rather than ameliorated the doctrinal 
confusion . . . .”); John T. Parry, Introduction: Due Process, Borders, and the 
Qualities of Sovereignty—Some Thoughts on J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 
16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 827, 841 (2012) (“[C]ompounds . . . uncertainty . . . .”).  
 135. See Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 878 (discussing how plaintiff filed a products 
liability suit for a machine produced by the defendant in England). 
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an interest in seeing that its citizen was able to obtain 
compensation for an industry.136 Equally, it was a given that the 
manufacturer of the machine actively sought to sell machinery 
throughout the U.S. market, which includes New Jersey.137 
Nonetheless, personal jurisdiction was found lacking.138 
A plurality opinion by Justice Kennedy looked at the forum 
specific contacts of the defendant.139 The defendant, J. McIntyre 
Machinery Co., had engaged in a long-term course of action in 
which it marketed its products to the U.S. as a whole.140 In 
connection with that, it had contracted with an affiliated U.S. 
company to handle sales in the U.S., advertised, attended trade 
shows, and otherwise sought to make sales in the U.S. market.141 
None of those activities, so far as is clear from the record, took 
place in the forum state of New Jersey, however.142 What’s more, 
while J. McIntyre had had some success in selling to the US, the 
limited market for large metal shredders left it without large 
numbers of sales in New Jersey—it was possible that the machine 
that caused the injury was the only one in the state, and at most 
one of no more than four.143 
On these facts, Justice Kennedy and the plurality found 
evidence that New Jersey specifically had been targeted to be 
lacking, and found that to be a fatal flaw for the assertion of 
personal jurisdiction within New Jersey.144 Because, in Kennedy’s 
                                                                                                     
 136. See id. at 887 (noting that the interest of New Jersey in protecting its 
citizens from defective products was strong, but jurisdiction was restrained by 
due process). 
 137. See id. at 878 (stating that an independent company had agreed to sell 
the defendant’s machines in the United States). 
 138. See id. at 887 (concluding that the defendant did not intend to “invoke or 
benefit” from the protection of New Jersey laws and that exercising jurisdiction 
would violate due process). 
 139. See id. at 886 (focusing on defendant’s sales in the United States, 
attendance of trade shows in the United States, and presence of defendant’s 
machines in New Jersey). 
 140. See id. at 879 (noting that the defendant’s U.S. distributor advertised the 
defendant’s machines in the United States at the direction of the defendant). 
 141. See id. at 886 (discussing the defendant’s contacts with the forum). 
 142. See id. (demonstrating the lack of contacts that the defendant had with 
New Jersey). 
 143. See id. (noting that the defendant neither advertised, nor sent employees 
to New Jersey). 
 144. See id. at 887 (“At no time did petitioner engage in an any activities in 
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view, personal jurisdiction requires a “forum by forum” analysis,145 
and because there was no evidence in the record that New Jersey 
was targeted individually as opposed to as part of a whole, personal 
jurisdiction did not lie.146 
Respondent has not established that J. McIntyre engaged in 
conduct purposefully directed at New Jersey. Recall that 
respondent’s claim of jurisdiction centers on three facts: The 
distributor agreed to sell J. McIntyre’s machines in the United 
States; J. McIntyre officials attended trade shows in several 
States but not in New Jersey; and up to four machines ended up 
in New Jersey. The British manufacturer had no office in New 
Jersey; it neither paid taxes nor owned property there; and it 
neither advertised in, nor sent any employees to, the State. 
Indeed, after discovery the trial court found that the “defendant 
does not have a single contact with New Jersey short of the 
machine in question ending up in this state.” App. to Pet. for 
Cert. 130a. These facts may reveal an intent to serve the U.S. 
market, but they do not show that J. McIntyre purposefully 
availed itself of the New Jersey market.147 
Justice Kennedy’s analysis suggests a roadmap for 
defendants—especially foreign defendants—to avoid personal 
jurisdiction. Avoiding contacts with any one state might suffice to 
defeat personal jurisdiction anywhere. Indeed, the simple 
expedient of appointing a nationwide distributor might be enough 
to create a barrier to personal jurisdiction.148 
                                                                                                     
New Jersey that reveal an intent to invoke or benefit from the protection of its 
laws.”). 
 145. Id. at 884. 
 146. See id. (“The question is whether a defendant has followed a course of 
conduct directed at the society or economy existing with the jurisdiction of a given 
sovereign . . . .”). 
 147. Id. at 886. 
 148. See Stewart E. Sterk, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 98 IOWA 
L. REV. 1163, 1201–02 (2013)  
Until J. McIntyre, no one would have supposed that the German 
manufacturer of the Robinsons’ allegedly defective Audi could have 
escaped jurisdiction in Oklahoma by giving an importer the exclusive 
right to distribute Audi automobiles throughout the United States. Yet 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion implicitly suggests that unless Audi 
specifically targeted Oklahoma in its marketing, the Oklahoma courts 
might not have jurisdiction, no matter how many Audis were sold in 
the United States. 
124 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 97 (2020) 
In a robust dissent, Justice Ginsburg proposed quite a 
different approach. Noting that New Jersey had a legitimate 
interest in addressing injuries to its citizen, and in regulating the 
safety of industrial products within its borders, she began with the 
recognition that New Jersey was neither a random nor a detached 
forum for the litigation.149 In terms of targeting, she looked to the 
national targeting, and was content that sales to New Jersey were 
an included and natural component of that broader targeting 
effort.150 
Justice Ginsburg also noted that the jurisdiction New Jersey 
sought to exercise was not, under international norms, excessive 
or extravagant: 
The Court’s judgment also puts United States plaintiffs at a 
disadvantage in comparison to similarly situated complainants 
elsewhere in the world. Of particular note, within the European 
Union, in which the United Kingdom is a participant, the 
jurisdiction New Jersey would have exercised is not at all 
exceptional. The European Regulation on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments provides for the 
exercise of specific jurisdiction “in matters relating to tort ... in 
the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred.” 
Council Reg. 44/2001, Art. 5, 2001 O.J. (L.12) 4. The European 
Court of Justice has interpreted this prescription to authorize 
jurisdiction either where the harmful act occurred or at the 
place of injury. See Handelskwekerij G.J. Bier B.V. v. Mines de 
Potasse d’Alsace S. A., 1976 E.C.R. 1735, 1748–1749.151 
The controlling opinion in the case was a concurrence by 
Justice Breyer, in which Justice Alito joined. Seemingly 
deliberately fact bound, the concurrence looked at the few sales 
made into New Jersey, and found it below the standard of ongoing 
                                                                                                     
 149. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 894–98 (2011) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing the instances of purposeful contact with 
United States by the defendant to promote sales of its product). As we will see 
infra, in many other nations the presence of an injured national within the forum 
combined with marketing that foreseeably and directly led to the presence of the 
allegedly defective product in the forum would be sufficient for an exercise of 
jurisdiction. 
 150. See id. at 898 (reasoning that defendant’s regular attendance of 
conventions and exhibitions in the United States expressed an intent to target 
customers anywhere in the country). 
 151. Id. at 909. 
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connection that had been found sufficient in prior cases.152 The 
concurrence, however, posited a broad range of different 
circumstances that might lead to different concerns and different 
results, and argued for more case development before hard and fast 
rules of either the kind proposed by Kennedy or urged by Ginsburg 
were adopted.153 
Nicastro, while split and confusing, made clear that at least a 
substantial portion of the Court would insist on state specific 
targeting, even by foreign corporations marketing to the U.S. as a 
whole.154 If adopted by a majority, this would further restrict the 
availability of specific jurisdiction for all defendants. The special 
impact state by state targeting has on foreign defendants requires 
a look. 
2. The Not-So-Special Case of International Defendants 
The Court has paid surprisingly little heed to the issue of 
whether defendants from outside the United States should be 
treated differently from domestic defendants when assessing 
personal jurisdiction.155 This reticence to engage the issue has 
                                                                                                     
 152. See id. at 889 (Breyer, J., concurring) (showing that the facts presented 
demonstrate “no ‘regular flow’ or ‘regular course’ of sales in New Jersey”). 
 153. See id. at 889–90 (referencing Justice Ginsburg’s opinion to show that 
other facts could have established jurisdiction). For an argument that lower 
courts have not chosen to follow Kennedy’s plurality but apply an analysis closer 
to the state court that was reversed, see Frank Deale, J. McIntyre and the Global 
Stream of Commerce, 16 CUNY L. REV. 269, 302 (2013) (“[W]hat is especially 
noteworthy is the infrequency with which courts follow the Kennedy plurality in 
circumstances where doing so will require a plaintiff injured in the United States 
to institute litigation in a foreign jurisdiction.”). This survey of lower court cases 
took place before Bristol-Myers reaffirmed the state sovereignty language of 
Kennedy’s opinion, and in any event the freedom of lower courts to take this 
approach depends, of course, on which tack the Supreme Court takes in future 
rulings that may generate a majority. See also Jack B. Harrison, Here and There 
and Back Again: Drowning in the Stream of Commerce, 44 STETSON L. REV. 1, 
29–39 (2014) (analyzing lower court applications of Nicastro). 
 154. See supra notes 133–152 and accompanying text (discussing the split 
opinions of the justices in Nicastro). 
 155. See Andrew L. Strauss, Where America Ends and the International Order 
Begins: Interpreting the Jurisdictional Reach of the U.S. Constitution in Light of 
a Proposed Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Satisfaction of Judgments, 61 
ALB. L. REV. 1237, 1237 (1998) (“[T]he Court has never articulated a discrete 
approach to international jurisdiction.”). But see Austen Parrish, Personal 
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come despite a substantial body of scholarship that engages the 
issue, and has proposed several justifications for treating alien 
defendants differently,156 and that even questions whether foreign 
                                                                                                     
Jurisdiction: The Transnational Difference, 59 VA. J. INT’L L. 97, 100 (2019) 
(arguing that the recent cases involving international defendants should be 
understood as involving special issues because of the international element and 
that their relevance to domestic cases should not be overstated).  
 156. See Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International 
Cases, 17 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 43 (1987) (“In state law international cases, 
the Due Process Clause should require consideration of foreign defendants’ 
national contacts [and] their contacts with the forum state. In federal question 
cases, a pure national contacts test, looking solely to the defendant’s contacts with 
the United States as a whole, should be used.”); Robert C. Casad, Personal 
Jurisdiction in Federal Question Cases, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1589, 1592 (1992) 
(arguing for national contacts test for aliens in state and federal courts if certain 
protections to assure fairness were met); Ronan E. Degnan & Mary Kay Kane, 
The Exercise of Jurisdiction over and Enforcement of Judgments Against Alien 
Defendants, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 799–800 (1988) (arguing for national contacts 
approach to alien defendants in state and federal courts); Dodge & Dodson, supra 
note 6 (arguing for national contacts approach for aliens in state and federal 
court); Robin J. Effron, Solving the Nonresident Alien Due Process Paradox in 
Personal Jurisdiction, 116 MLR ONLINE 123, 129–30 (2018) (suggesting a 
national contacts test for both state and federal cases); Graham C. Lilly, 
Jurisdiction over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 85 (1983) 
(arguing for national contacts approach to alien defendants in federal court); 
Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction over 
Nonresident Alien Defendants, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2006) (arguing that due 
process does not apply to alien defendants and hence national contacts can be 
aggregated); Bradley W. Paulson, Personal Jurisdiction over Aliens: Unraveling 
Entangled Case Law, 13 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 117 (1990) (arguing for amendment to 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to provide national aggregation of minimum 
contacts for alien defendants); Wendy Perdue, Aliens, the Internet, and 
“Purposeful Availment”: A Reassessment of Fifth Amendment Limits on Personal 
Jurisdiction, 98 NW. L. REV. 455, 470 (2004) (arguing that for aliens “it is 
constitutional under the Fifth Amendment for U.S. courts to assert personal 
jurisdiction solely on the basis of effects in the U.S., without any requirement of 
‘purposeful availment’”); Taylor Simpson-Wood, In the Aftermath of Goodyear 
Dunlop: Oyez! Oyez! Oyez! A Call for a Hybrid Approach to Personal Jurisdiction 
in International Products Liability Controversies, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 113, 139 
(arguing that, in both federal and state court, “premising a finding of jurisdiction 
by aggregating the contacts of the foreign defendant with the U.S. resulting from 
its participation in a distribution system is inherently fair and reasonable”); 
Toran, supra note 60, at 770–88 (arguing for national contacts approach to alien 
defendants); see also Donald Earl Childress III, Rethinking Legal Globalization: 
The Case of Transnational Personal Jurisdiction, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 
1490 (2013) (arguing for allowing personal jurisdiction when the defendant has 
received constitutionally adequate notice, the state has a “constitutionally 
sufficient” interest in applying its law or resolving a dispute involving its 
domiciliaries, and policies of other nations are considered and would not be 
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defendants are entitled to any Due Process protections.157 
There are two differences implicit in the Court’s cases to date. 
First, and perhaps most importantly, is the change effected by the 
restriction of general jurisdiction in Daimler and Goodyear.158 
Before those cases, a foreign corporation with systematic and 
continuous operations in a U.S. state would be seen by most U.S. 
courts as being subject to general jurisdiction in that 
location — even for cases arising in distant parts with no connection 
to the U.S. operations.159 As the facts of Daimler suggest, where 
California was sought as a forum to address charges of human 
rights violations in Argentina with no U.S. nexus, this broad of an 
approach had the possible effect of opening U.S. courts to all kinds 
of cases against multinational corporations with a significant U.S. 
presence—which is to say, against almost all major multinational 
corporations.160 
Daimler put that approach to bed, and in its approach created 
an implicit distinction between domestic and alien corporations.161 
                                                                                                     
adversely affected); Andrew L. Strauss, Beyond National Law: The Neglected Role 
of the International Law of Personal Jurisdiction in Domestic Courts, 36 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 373 (1995) (arguing for applying international law of jurisdiction when 
alien defendants are involved). For a discussion of issues involving plaintiffs, see 
Debra Lyn Bassett, U.S. Class Actions Go Global: Transnational Class Actions 
and Personal Jurisdiction, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 41, 61–76 (2003) (looking at the 
issue of binding international plaintiff class members in transnational class 
actions). But see Jonathan Remy Nash, National Personal Jurisdiction, 68 EMORY 
L.J. 509, 549–55 (2019) (arguing that no special standard should exist for alien 
defendants). 
 157. See Parrish, supra note 156, at 59 (“The jurisdictional standards derived 
from the due process clause have blithely been assumed to apply to foreign 
defendants. No coherent explanation, however, exists for why nonresident, alien 
defendants are entitled to constitutional protections in the jurisdictional 
context.”). 
 158. See supra notes 102–104 and accompanying text (explaining how these 
cases narrowed the definition of general jurisdiction to apply only in situations 
where a defendant can be said to be “at home” in the jurisdiction). 
 159. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (recalling a time when general 
jurisdiction could be based simply on “continuous and systematic general business 
contacts”). 
 160. See supra notes 83–87 and accompanying text (explaining how the effects 
of globalization and the concentration of economic wealth in major corporations 
create a world where many multinational companies engage in systematic and 
continuous contacts in many locations in the United States).  
 161. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 122 (2014) (emphasizing that 
a U.S. court may exercise jurisdiction over a foreign corporation only when it can 
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Domestic corporations are likely to have both a principal place of 
business and a state of incorporation within the U.S., making them 
subject to suit somewhere in the U.S. under general jurisdiction.162 
Alien corporations, by definition, will have neither, and so will not 
be subject to general jurisdiction within the U.S.163 
Another distinction, which is less automatic, dates back to 
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court.164 In Asahi, the Court 
faced a situation where all that remained of a tort case was an 
impleader claim filed by a foreign defendant against another 
foreign defendant.165 The Justices split 4–4 on whether minimum 
contacts existed where the stream of commerce had brought the 
offending product into the U.S.166 An eight-justice majority did 
conclude, however, that it would not be “reasonable” to exert 
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant where the remaining center 
of gravity of the case lay elsewhere.167 
The reasonableness test employed by the Court in Asahi 
looked at multiple factors, including “the burden on the defendant, 
the interests of the forum State, . . . the plaintiff’s interest in 
                                                                                                     
be rendered essentially “at home” in the forum State).  
 162. See id. at 137 (defining a corporation’s domicile, where it is subject to 
general jurisdiction, to include either its place of incorporation or principal place 
of business). 
 163. This leaves aside the issue of whether the general jurisdiction of a U.S. 
subsidiary can be imputed to the overseas parent, an issue briefed but not reached 
in Daimler. See Qingxiu Bu, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction vis-à-vis Sovereignty in 
Tackling Transnational Counterfeits: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 100 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 69, 74 (2018) (discussing post-Daimler lower court 
cases involving separate legal entities within a corporate structure). 
 164. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 165. See id. at 106 (“[Claims against] the other defendants were eventually 
settled and dismissed, leaving only [the Taiwanese tube manufacturer]’s 
indemnity action against [the Japanese tire valve manufacturer].”). 
 166. Compare id. at 112 (“[Asahi’s] placement of a product into the stream of 
commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed 
toward the forum State.”), with id. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing Asahi 
“engaged in a higher quantum of conduct” than simply a placement of a product 
into a stream of commerce), and id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that 
jurisdiction premised solely on the placement of a product into the stream of 
commerce is consistent with the Due Process Clause).  
 167. See id. at 115 (“Considering the international context, the heavy burden 
on the alien defendant, and the slight interests of the plaintiff and the forum 
State, the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a California court over Asahi in this 
instance would be unreasonable and unfair.”). 
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obtaining relief[,] . . . ‘the interstate judicial system’s interest in 
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies[,] and the 
shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental 
substantive social policies.”’168 Applying this test to the facts of 
Asahi, the Court found alienage highly relevant to the 
reasonableness test, and placed major reliance on “[t]he unique 
burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal 
system.”169 
The Court’s reliance on alienage in Asahi was one factor in 
what must be a multi-factor balancing system, and stops far short 
of establishing an absolute rule or even a presumption that 
personal jurisdiction against an alien defendant will not be 
reasonable. That said, some scholars have viewed reasonableness 
as being especially directed at alien defendants,170 and a study of 
specific personal jurisdiction cases examining use of the 
reasonableness test found that courts were far more likely to 
dismiss on reasonableness (rather than minimum contacts) 
grounds when the defendant was an alien.171 
A more subtle issue with foreign defendants has to do with the 
rules related to jurisdictional challenges. Unlike as is true in most 
motions to dismiss, the court should not accept the plaintiff’s 
allegations with regard to personal jurisdiction as true; rather, the 
plaintiff has the burden of establishing a factual basis for personal 
jurisdiction.172 With regard to a foreign defendant selling 
                                                                                                     
 168. Id. at 113 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 
286, 292 (1980)). 
 169. Id. at 114. 
 170. See Dodge & Dodson, supra note 83, at 1207 (discussing the differences 
in the treatment of aliens and domestic defendants in personal jurisdiction 
matters). 
 171. See Linda J. Silberman & Nathan D. Yaffe, The Transnational Case in 
Conflict of Laws: Two Suggestions for the New Restatement Third of Conflict of 
Laws—Judicial Jurisdiction over Foreign Defendants and Party Autonomy in 
International Contracts, 27 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 405, 408 (2017) (“[C]ourts 
in practice only dismiss on reasonableness grounds where the defendant is 
foreign, whereas they effectively never dismiss domestic defendants on grounds 
of reasonableness.”); see generally Leslie W. Abramson, Clarifying “Fair Play and 
Substantial Justice”: How the Courts Apply the Supreme Court Standard for 
Personal Jurisdiction, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 441 (1991) (discussing generally 
the application by lower courts of the reasonableness factors). 
 172. See Charles W. Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward a New 
Equilibrium in Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207, 257 (2014) 
(“For purposes of jurisdiction, in particular, it is error to accept the plaintiff’s 
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nationally in the U.S., even though it may be clear that the U.S. 
market was targeted, whether a specific state was targeted may 
not be clear from publicly available information.173 While, in 
theory, jurisdictional discovery could solve this problem, other 
nations often have no equivalent of U.S. private discovery, and 
actually getting discovery information from an overseas defendant 
can be a challenge.174 As a practical matter, establishing the 
factual predicates for personal jurisdiction over foreign 
defendants, especially if the proof required must establish 
granular targeting of a kind that cannot be deduced from the 
regular presence of the product in the stream of commerce, can 
make it more difficult to bring foreign defendants into court.175 
Despite these structural differences, the Court’s analysis of 
cases, such as Nicastro, that involved foreign defendants have 
stayed far away from taking into express account the non-U.S. 
nature of these defendants.176 This is curious for a number of 
reasons, especially as state-versus-state sovereignty concerns 
                                                                                                     
allegations as true.”); Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Inextricable Merits 
Problem in Personal Jurisdiction, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1301, 1330 (2012) (“If 
the court automatically accepts the plaintiff’s allegations as true, it will be 
assuming the existence of facts giving rise to jurisdiction—and it will thereby 
assume the existence of jurisdiction even in cases where it lacks the power to 
act.”). 
 173. See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 886 (2011) 
(Kennedy, J., plurality) (finding no conclusive proof that defendant had engaged 
in conduct purposefully directed at New Jersey when 1) defendant agreed to sell 
machines in the United States, 2) attended trade shows in several other states, 
and 3) four machines ended up in New Jersey).  
 174. See, e.g., Ray Worthy Campbell & Ellen Claar Campbell, Clash of 
Systems: Discovery in U.S. Litigation Involving Chinese Defendants, 4 PEKING U. 
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 129, 161 (2016) (discussing a case where jurisdictional 
discovery was only obtained after the trial judge issued an order banning the 
Chinese defendant from doing any business in the United States) (citing Germano 
v. Taishan Gypsum Co., No. 2047, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183686, at *5 (E.D. La. 
July 17, 2014)); id. at 144 (describing a case where jurisdictional discovery against 
a third party had to be compelled with punitive fines) (citing Gucci Am., Inc. v. 
Huoqing, No C-09-05969, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 783, at *58–59 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 
2011)). 
 175. See Campbell & Campbell, supra note 174, at 150–54 (emphasizing the 
differences in discovery procedures internationally and the difficulty of merging 
them with the U.S. approach). 
 176. See Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 881 (applying the “purposeful availment” test 
to foreign and domestic defendants alike without differentiation).  
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move back into the analysis.177 There is some question as to 
whether nonresident alien defendants can even invoke the 
constitutional liberty interest viewed in older cases as being at the 
core of the doctrine.178 
It matters because U.S. citizens might be sent to a foreign 
forum. As the Court noted in Asahi, litigating in a foreign land 
under strange laws can be a burden.179 In some cases, this may be 
the fate to which U.S. citizens are consigned as U.S. courts are 
closed, as they might be if the test requires a relationship with a 
specific state. Even if a domestic U.S. forum exists for the alien 
defendant, it will not be the home forum for the defendant.180 If the 
defendant is domestic, a U.S. state might have an arguable 
interest in the litigation involving its citizen; when the defendant 
is foreign, with the relationship created solely by the defendant’s 
state of mind, the alternative U.S. forum may have no real interest 
in the litigation.181 It may be a state like Ohio would have been in 
Nicastro, with no connection with the dispute except that at one 
time the defendant through one sided actions “purposefully 
availed” itself of a relationship with the forum by using Ohio as the 
state of entry for its products.182 In such a situation, while personal 
                                                                                                     
 177. See infra Part III.A.  
 178. See Aaron D. Simowitz, Legislating Transnational Jurisdiction, 57 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 325, 329 (2018) (“The Court has assumed, but never held, that foreign 
parties enjoy Due Process jurisdictional protections—an assumption in tension 
with the general rule that foreign parties acquire constitutional rights in 
proportion to their connections to the United States.”); see also Drobak, supra note 
134, at 1739–40 (arguing that non-resident aliens have no due process 
protections); Parrish, supra note 156, at 28–32 (suggesting Due Process 
protections do not apply to alien defendants). 
 179. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987) (“The 
unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system 
should have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the 
long arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders.”). 
 180. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 122 (2014) (emphasizing that 
a U.S. court may exercise jurisdiction over a foreign corporation only when it can 
be rendered essentially “at home” in the forum State). 
 181. See, e.g., Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113–16 (noting the minimal interest the 
forum of California has in asserting jurisdiction over the foreign defendant in a 
context where the only relationship with the forum hinges on the defendant 
purposefully engaging in forum activities). 
 182. See Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 896 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“From at least 
1995 until 2001, [defendant] retained an Ohio-based company, [McIntyre 
America], as its exclusive distributor for the entire United States.”) (internal 
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jurisdiction might exist, the suit might be subject to dismissal 
under state forum non conveniens doctrine, leaving the U.S. 
plaintiff, again, with no U.S. forum.183 
The Court’s failure to treat alien defendants differently—or 
even to consider whether it should treat alien defendants 
differently—contrasts with a body of scholarship that argues for 
different treatment.184 Recognizing that international marketers 
may not target local markets, and that connections with any one 
state may be attenuated in a national marketing scheme, several 
scholars have called for an approach that aggregates national 
contacts.185 
Curiously, in Nicastro, Justice Kennedy’s plurality posited 
that Congress might be able to base personal jurisdiction on 
national contacts with regard to federal court, but that in state 
courts the only relevant contacts were those connected to the state, 
even for foreign defendants.  
In this case, petitioner directed marketing and sales efforts at 
the United States. It may be that, assuming it were otherwise 
empowered to legislate on the subject, the Congress could 
authorize the exercise of jurisdiction in appropriate 
courts . . . . Here the question concerns the authority of a New 
Jersey state court to exercise jurisdiction, so it is petitioner’s 
purposeful contacts with New Jersey, not with the United 
States, that alone are relevant.186 
If adopted by the entire court, Justice Kennedy’s requirement 
of a state-by-state focus creates a disconnect between regulatory 
realities and personal jurisdiction. While, as Justice Kennedy 
noted, some foreign companies might indeed engage in 
state-by-state targeting,187 it seems just as likely that with regard 
                                                                                                     
quotations omitted).  
 183. See Dodge & Dodson, supra note 83, at 1231–32 (stating that suit in 
unrelated forum would “almost certainly” be dismissed on grounds of forum non 
conveniens). 
 184. See, e.g., Degnan & Kane, supra note 156, at 799–800 (arguing for a 
national contacts approach to alien defendants in state and federal courts). 
 185. See id. at 820 (proposing that the court, in assessing a foreign defendant’s 
contacts, should consider their aggregate strength). 
 186. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 885–86 (2011) 
(Kennedy, J., plurality). 
 187. See id. at 884–85 (“Furthermore, foreign corporations will often target or 
concentrate on particular States, subjecting them to specific jurisdiction in those 
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to geography, the U.S. market as a whole would be the target.188 
Brands may be developed globally, and probably will be for major 
companies.189 For products, advertising venues, national trade 
shows, and online retailers all present products to national rather 
than local audiences, and in at least some cases those venturing 
into the U.S. market will hope to capture as wide an audience as 
possible.190 Others, looking for niches, might define those niches by 
categories other than state boundaries.191 Under Justice Kennedy’s 
formulation, only those who develop sufficient contacts with one or 
                                                                                                     
forums.”). 
 188. See Harrison, supra note 153, at 2 (“[I]n today’s global economy a 
manufacturer’s specific intentional contact with an individual state is a rarity.”); 
Hay, supra note 60, at 434 (“[T]he foreign-country manufacturer deals with the 
United States as a single market. Its concern is presumably less with whether the 
defendant is subject to suit in state X or state Y, but rather whether it is subject 
to suit in the United States at all.”); Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, 
Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1385–86 (2006) 
[M]ost products are mass produced and mass distributed, without any 
clear sense of where in the national market they might end up . . . . The 
upshot is that most manufacturers design and market uniform 
products rather than different products for each state and, 
correspondingly, design their products to the specifications of the 
largest states or to the jurisdiction with the most stringent liability 
standards . . . . 
 189. Justice Kennedy’s analysis reveals a critical lack of awareness of how 
consumers are targeted by brands, and not just by efforts to sell particular 
products. Important brands today are global, with marketing campaigns designed 
to establish the brand across not just state but national borders. See BARBARA E. 
KAHN, GLOBAL BRAND POWER: LEVERAGING BRANDING FOR LONG TERM GROWTH 
1 (“Brands today must be global . . . . [A] strong global brand must express the 
same core meanings regardless of the market it is in.”). While brand holders 
selling specific products will necessarily adapt branding and sales techniques to 
fit local cultures and communities, there is no particular reason to think that 
those adaptations will follow state lines—that, for example, a foreign 
manufacturer will present its brand and products differently in New Jersey than 
in Delaware. See Issacharoff, supra note 188, at 1385–86 (explaining how mass 
production requires goods to be produced for potential distribution and sale 
anywhere demand might arise, without a particular location in mind).  
 190. See Harrison, supra note 153, at 2 (explaining how manufacturers use 
national and international marketing campaigns or the assistance of the Internet 
to make entire nations the target audience for its products).  
 191. For example, while it markets somewhat differently in the U.S. than in 
other countries, the targeting for the Estee Lauder Origins brand in the U.S. 
turns on demographics rather than geography. See KAHN, supra note 189, at 
34 – 35 (“[T]oday’s Origins brand is more tightly focused on a key target segment 
in the United States, the 35- to 45-year-old woman who is concerned with health 
and with the products she chooses to put on her face.”). 
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more particular states would be subject to jurisdiction in U.S. state 
courts, notwithstanding the success of their marketing efforts.192 
D. Current U.S. Personal Jurisdiction in Comparative Context 
At one time, U.S. jurisdiction could with some fairness be 
accused of being exorbitant.193 Before Daimler, general jurisdiction 
as it was commonly understood allowed assertion of claims, 
regardless of connection with the forum, in any location where the 
defendant maintained sufficient continuous and systematic 
contacts.194 As a practical matter, operation of a significant 
operation in a given location made it a forum suitable for any claim 
from anywhere in the world, so far as personal jurisdiction was 
concerned.195 (There were, of course, other obstacles to having the 
suit proceed in that location, such as forum non conveniens).196 
That changed after Daimler.197 Except in rare and so far 
unseen circumstances, general jurisdiction can be found only 
where a company is headquartered or has its principal place of 
business.198 For foreign corporations, that will be nowhere in the 
United States.199 
                                                                                                     
 192. See Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 885–86 (emphasizing that petitioner’s 
purposeful contacts with New Jersey, not with the United States, are the only 
relevant contacts in establishing personal jurisdiction). 
 193. See supra Part II.C.  
 194. See Cornett, supra note 80, at 104 (“Daimler departs from settled law 
under which corporations have been subject to jurisdiction for all claims in states 
where they maintained a sufficient permanent presence or engaged in a 
comparable substantial level of business.”). 
 195. See Dodson, supra note 81, at 24 (explaining the common understanding 
that companies doing substantial business in all fifty states would have been 
subject to general jurisdiction in every state). 
 196. See Heiser, supra note 85, at 1050–56 (discussing application of the 
forum non conveniens doctrine in limiting the reach of general jurisdiction). 
 197. See generally Cornett, supra note 80. 
 198. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014) (defining a 
corporation’s domicile, where it is subject to general jurisdiction, to include either 
its place of incorporation or principal place of business). 
 199. See Cornett, supra note 80, at 152 (“Where the manufacturer is a foreign 
national corporation with its principal place of business outside the United 
States, the corporation may evade general jurisdiction in any U.S. court.”).  
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After Nicastro and Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Court of 
Cal.,200 while some doubt remains, it seems that specific 
jurisdiction may also require the clearing of a high hurdle.201 Each 
claim by each plaintiff against each defendant must be assessed 
for forum specific contacts related to that claim.202 That each claim 
must be assessed is clear from the nature of specific jurisdiction, 
which bases personal jurisdiction on only those contacts that are 
related to the claim.203 That each defendant must be assessed 
separately was made clear in cases such as Rush v. Savchuk,204 
where personal jurisdiction against some defendants did not bleed 
over to other defendants.205 That each plaintiff must be assessed 
separately, even when there is an ongoing case that the defendant 
must defend, is clear from Bristol-Myers.206  
In a complex case, that personal jurisdiction exists for a claim 
by one plaintiff against one defendant does not guarantee that 
personal jurisdiction exists for other claims and other parties that 
are part of the same case.207 To help illuminate the situation, 
                                                                                                     
 200. 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 201. See supra Part II.C(1)(b).  
 202. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781–82 (emphasizing that each 
individual plaintiff must have minimum contacts with the forum and finding that 
the nonresident plaintiffs’ connections with the applicable forum did not warrant 
jurisdiction on this claim).  
 203. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 899 (2011) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Court agrees that specific 
jurisdiction turns on an affiliation between the forum and the underlying 
controversy).  
 204. 444 U.S. 320 (1980). 
 205. See id. at 331–32 (characterizing an attempt to aggregate the defendants’ 
forum contacts “plainly unconstitutional”). This was also the case in World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). In World-Wide Volkswagen, 
it seems likely under the law of the time that the existence of general jurisdiction 
against the German parent and the U.S. importer was assumed due to the high 
level of activity each had in Oklahoma. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 
297 (stating that if the sale of a product is not an isolated occurrence, but arises 
from the efforts of the manufacturer to serve the market, directly or indirectly, 
for its product in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject the manufacturer 
to suit in one of those states). After Daimler, it is clear that general jurisdiction 
would not exist against those defendants. See Cornett, supra note 80, at 105–06 
(describing Daimler as a “game changer” in restricting the existing law of 
personal jurisdiction).  
 206. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781–82 (stating that each individual 
plaintiff must have minimum contacts with the forum).  
 207. See, e.g., id. at 1781 (explaining that the nonresident defendants’ 
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consider a case similar to the well-known civil procedure standard 
of Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.208 
Imagine that in Hubei province, China, a company makes a valve 
designed to be used in water heaters. Since, in China, an export 
license must be acquired for goods to be sold abroad, the seller is 
aware that the product will head overseas, and given the flow of 
world trade is most likely generally aware that some will end up 
in the United States. In addition, as a practical matter, the 
manufacturer may have taken steps to qualify under international 
quality assurance protocols such as ISO 9001, again indicating an 
awareness of export markets. In our hypothetical, the valve is sold 
to a water heater manufacturer in Guangdong Province, which 
includes it in products that have been designed for, among other 
markets, sale in the United States. Using an export company that 
provides the necessary export license, these water heaters are then 
sold in massive quantities to a distributor in Hong Kong, which in 
turn sells them in massive quantities to markets in the United 
States. 
On these facts, general jurisdiction clearly does not exist.209 
Quite possibly, neither does specific jurisdiction, especially if the 
state-by-state targeting imagined by the plurality in Nicastro is 
required.210 Even if the water heater manufacturer explicitly dealt 
with the export agent and the Hong Kong distributor in order to 
get access to the U.S. market, and even if the product was 
specifically designed for the U.S. market (say, for example, by 
being designed to use 110 volt power instead of the internationally 
more common 220 volt), evidence of state-specific targeting is 
likely to be lacking at the manufacturer level. Even for the Hong 
Kong distributor—which is not likely to have been responsible for 
either defective design or defective manufacturing, and may be 
                                                                                                     
relationship with the defendants who were California residents was insufficient 
basis for the nonresidents to establish personal jurisdiction for a claim before the 
California courts). 
 208. 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). 
 209. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137 (defining a corporation’s domicile, where it 
is subject to general jurisdiction, to include either its place of incorporation or 
principal place of business). Here, the hypothetical valve company is not 
incorporated, nor does it have a place of business, in the United States.  
 210. See supra notes 186–187 and accompanying text (discussing Justice 
Kennedy’s proposal of a state-by-state, as opposed to national, focus for contacts 
determining personal jurisdiction in state courts).  
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equally unaware of any problems, and so may not be liable in any 
event211—evidence of state-by-state targeting may not exist if the 
distributor dealt with a national retailer or national distributor to 
the plumbing trade. 
Consider the situation in the reverse, assuming a valve 
manufactured in Ohio, incorporated in a water heater in Illinois, 
then shipped to China. In China, as in many civil law countries, 
jurisdiction lies not just where the defendant is domiciled but 
where the tort took place.   
According to the Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court 
on the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s 
Republic of China, Art. 24, “places where the tort occurs” include 
the places where the tort is committed and the places where the 
result of a tort occurs.212 In the hypothetical case, the hazardous 
products have caused bodily damages and property damages in 
China. Therefore, the results of the tortious acts happen within 
Chinese territorial boundaries, permitting a Chinese court to 
exercise jurisdiction.213 Put differently, if the plaintiff is injured by 
                                                                                                     
 211. In many cases, so-called “seller’s exception statutes” will release an 
innocent seller or distributor who was not aware of the alleged defect. See, e.g., 
Nicholas Owen McCann, The “Seller’s Exception” Defense to Product Liability 
Actions, 103 ILL. B.J. 40 (2015) (discussing application of Illinois statute). The 
application of these statutes is complex, however, because of varying exceptions 
allowing the retailer to be sued, including in some cases where the manufacturer 
is immune to service of process. See, e.g., Ashley L. Thompson, Note, The 
Unintended Consequence of Tort Reform in Michigan: An Argument for 
Reinstating Retailer Product Liability, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 961 (2009) 
(arguing that liability over retailers should be reinstated because foreign 
manufacturers could evade jurisdiction). For a more general discussion of reseller 
liability, see Robert A. Sachs, Product Liability Reform and Seller Liability: A 
Proposal for Change, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 1031, 1081–1120 (2003) (discussing 
shortcomings in existing seller liability statutes and proposing a statutory 
solution). In addition, some major online marketplaces disclaim liability, claiming 
that when they only serve as a listing service they have no exposure. In one such 
case, Amazon paid only a $5000 nuisance settlement when a motorcycle helmet 
fraudulently listed as compliant with regulations failed, causing death. See 
Alexandra Berzon et al., Amazon Has Ceded Control of Its Site. The Result: 
Thousands of Banned, Unsafe or Mislabeled Products, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 23, 
2019 8:56 AM ET), https://perma.cc/M8M7-JM9H (last visited Oct. 14, 2019) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 212. The Supreme People’s Court, Interpretations of the Supreme People’s 
Court on Applicability of the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of 
China, Art. 24 (Jan. 30, 2015), https://perma.cc/P9RH-QDXD (PDF).  
 213. See id. at Art. 26 (granting jurisdiction to the court in the location where 
the tort was committed in any lawsuit filed in connection with property or 
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the failure of a product in China, a Chinese court would most likely 
assert jurisdiction. 
China’s approach is not exceptional, but tracks the approach 
of many, if not most, civil law countries.214 Rather than engaging 
in an analysis of what expectations or intentions the defendant had 
at the time the product was designed or marketed, the analysis 
looks to where the tortious act occurred—which is to say, where 
the product failed and where injury occurred.215 Arguments that 
the forum is not an appropriate forum for the litigation must follow 
a different path than arguing that the country lacks power to hear 
a case where a citizen was injured within its borders by a 
malfunctioning product.216 
This approach avoids some of the complications of the U.S. 
approach. Jurisdiction is not a defendant-by-defendant or 
claim-by-claim analysis, but an inquiry into whether the court has 
a reasonable relationship with the case.217 The failure of a product 
in the forum country combined with an injured plaintiff in the 
forum provides a sufficient relationship.218 There is no suggestion 
that anyone look at whether the valve manufacturer sought to 
have a relationship with the Guangdong or Hubei provinces, or 
even if any particular awareness of China’s domestic subparts was 
ever a consideration. 
The net is that U.S. courts in the post-Daimler, post-Nicastro, 
post-Bristol-Myers era seem in garden variety products liability 
cases, among others, to assert a much shorter jurisdictional reach 
                                                                                                     
personal damage arising from inferior quality of manufactured products or 
services). The European Union has a similar rule. Council Regulation 44/2001 of 
22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters, 2001 O.J. (L 012) 1 (EC).  
 214. See Ryngaert, supra note 129 (discussing the approach of other civil law 
countries). 
 215. Id.  
 216. Id.; see also Linda Silberman, Comparative Jurisdiction in the 
International Context: Will the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention Be 
Stalled, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 319, 328–31 (2002). 
 217. Ryngaert, supra note 129.  
 218. Id.  
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than other countries.219 Claims that would proceed without undue 
worry in other countries fail in the United States.220  
This failure matters, in particular, because the U.S. conducts 
so much of its regulatory activity and consumer protection through 
the court system.221 Closing the U.S. courts to such claims 
therefore, to an extent much greater than in other countries, also 
cancels U.S. regulatory protections. The inability of U.S. courts to 
effectively regulate and protect its citizens and markets implicates 
its national sovereignty.222 The degree to which specific jurisdiction 
will be narrowed depends in large part on how the justices 
approach the ideas of federalism and state sovereignty expressed 
in the Nicastro plurality and repeated in the Bristol-Myers 
holding.223 Those ideas deserve unpacking. 
III. The Supreme Court’s Flawed Approach to Horizontal 
Rivalrous State Federalism 
In Nicastro and Bristol-Myers, the Justices’ foreclosing 
assertions of specific personal jurisdiction relied on a shorthand 
invocation of “our federalism” as the basis.224 For those used to the 
                                                                                                     
 219. See, e.g., Fed. Home Loan Bank of Bos. v. Moody’s Corp., 821 F.3d 102, 
106–07 (1st Cir. 2016) (failing to find personal jurisdiction for defendant under 
Daimler standard); Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S., 750 F.3d 221, 
223 (2d Cir. 2014) (interpreting Daimler to reaffirm the extension of general 
jurisdiction beyond an entity’s state of incorporation and principal place of 
business to only exist in “exceptional” cases and declining to find the defendant 
“at home” in New York). 
 220. The injury in Nicastro, for example, would in most other countries be 
viewed as a tort occurring within the jurisdiction, allowing an assertion of court 
power. See, e.g., Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court, supra note 212, at 
Art. 26. Similarly, much of the angst over stream-of-commerce products liability 
would be unnecessary. 
 221. See generally SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC 
REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE UNITED STATES 19–59 (2010).  
 222.  See Jeffrey M. Schmitt, Rethinking the State Sovereignty Interest in 
Personal Jurisdiction, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 800 (2016) (explaining how 
“if a state lacked the power to regulate in-state conduct in a way that caused 
extraterritorial effects, state sovereignty would be eviscerated in our modern 
interconnected nation”).  
 223. See infra Part III.  
 224. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 
1776 (2017) (asserting that despite all other interests being in favor of granting 
jurisdiction, “interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its 
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debates over state and federal power in the standard back and 
forth over vertical federalism, the kind of federalism asserted in 
Nicastro and Bristol-Myers is a curious kind of federalism.225 It is 
all the more curious because while invoking “our federalism” in 
both Nicastro and Bristol-Myers, the Justices have shown no 
interest in explaining how they understand and wish to apply “our 
federalism.”226 
In the academic world, at least, federalism comes in more 
flavors than can be found at a well-stocked gelato stand. There is 
state sovereignty federalism,227 nationalist federalism,228 political 
process federalism,229 competitive federalism,230 cooperative 
                                                                                                     
power” (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 
(1980))). 
 225. See id. at 1780–81 (discussing federalism in the context of jurisdiction 
analysis); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884–885 (2011) 
(Kennedy, J., plurality) (same). 
 226. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (lacking any explanation of 
“federalism interests” other than as a restriction imposed by the sovereignty of 
other states on the sovereignty of each individual state); Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 
884–85 (stating simply that “if another state were to assert jurisdiction in an 
inappropriate case, it would upset the federal balance, which posits that each 
State has a sovereignty that is not subject to unlawful intrusion by other States”).  
 227. See MARTIN DIAMOND, THE FOUNDING OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 
124–25 (1981) (“Modern federalism is a system of divided sovereignty; the whole 
unseparated governing authority respecting certain matters given to the national 
government, and the whole unseparated governing authority respecting others 
given to the states. . . . [T]he American system is the very model of a modern 
federal system[.]”). Diamond proceeds to a more nuanced discussion of how 
federalism operates in the modern era. Id. 
 228. For a discussion of this and a helpful review of federalism literature, see 
generally Heather K. Gerken, Federalism 3.0, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1695 (2017). 
See also Heather K. Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism: Time for a Détente?, 
59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 997, 997 (2015) (characterizing the debate between 
nationalists and state sovereignty federalist like a boxing match between “aging 
boxing club members” who know each other’s moves). 
 229. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The 
Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 
54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954) (arguing that the national political process of the 
United States today, especially the role of states in selecting the federal 
government, continues to be well-adapted to promoting federalism). 
 230. See generally THOMAS R. DYE, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: COMPETITION 
AMONG GOVERNMENTS (1990) (proposing, as a solution to governmental abuse of 
power, the encouragement of rivalry among state and local governments to offer 
taxpayers the best array of public services at the lowest costs).  
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federalism,231 dual federalism,232 new nationalism federalism,233 
horizontal federalism,234 diagonal federalism,235 polyphonic 
federalism,236 foreign affairs federalism,237 and many more. These 
tags represent serious work at understanding how our compound 
government does and should work, both based on the text of the 
Constitution and digging deep into how it functions on the ground 
                                                                                                     
 231. See Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for 
Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 665 (2001) (“In contrast to a dual 
federalism, cooperative federalism envisions a sharing of regulatory authority 
between the federal government and the states that allows states to regulate 
within a framework delineated by federal law.”) For a critique of cooperative 
federalism, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative 
Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 
96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 938–44 (1998) (proposing a functional theory of cooperative 
federalism as an alternative to the theory of nationalistic dual federalism). 
 232. See Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 
1, 1–4 (1950) (discussing the United States’ acceptance of a shift toward 
consolidation of national power in the 1950s, moving away from a system in which 
power is divided between the federal and state governments in clearly defined 
terms). 
 233. See Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An 
Overview, 123 YALE L.J. 1889, 1892–94 (2014) (describing how federalism may 
serve national ends and promote a well-functioning national democracy). 
 234. See, e.g., JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM: INTERSTATE 
RELATIONS (2011); Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493 
(2008). 
 235. See Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change 
Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 ALA. L. REV. 237, 267–88 (2011) 
(describing a multidimensional approach to federalism that incorporates actors 
at all vertical levels of government and involves coordination among these actions 
through horizontal relationships). 
 236. See ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE 
PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 92–120 (2009) (proposing a model of 
federalism that emphasizes the interaction of state and federal law and more 
accurately reflects the intersecting realities of local and national power); Robert 
A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243 
(2005) (arguing for a “polyphonic” view of federalism); Robert A. Schapiro, 
Federalism as Intersystemic Governance: Legitimacy in a Post-Westphalian 
World, 57 EMORY L.J. 115 (2007) [hereinafter Schapiro, Intersystemic 
Governance] (outlining the concept of polyphonic federalism and applying it to 
issues of governmental legitimacy). 
 237. See generally MICHAEL J. GLENNON & ROBERT D. SLOANE, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS FEDERALISM: THE MYTH OF NATIONAL EXCLUSIVITY (2016) (examining 
the role cities and states play directly in foreign affairs); see also Robert B. Ahdieh, 
Foreign Affairs, International Law, and the New Federalism: Lessons from 
Coordination, 73 MO. L. REV. 1185 (2008). 
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as our culture and economy have changed. Kennedy’s wave of the 
hand at “our federalism” engaged not at all with this dialogue.238 
To a significant, but not exclusive, degree, the federalism 
debate addresses the split of power between the federal 
government and the states.239 State sovereignty federalists argue 
for more autonomy for states; nationalists argue for the primacy of 
the federal government.240 Cooperative federalists note that, in the 
modern era, state and federal regulatory programs are effectively 
intertwined, albeit with the federal branch holding a dominant 
position.241 
In the common parlance of federalism, the discussion is largely 
one about state power versus federal power.242 From the vantage 
                                                                                                     
 238. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884 (2011) 
(mentioning briefly that “ours is a ‘legal system unprecedented in form and 
design, establishing two orders of government, each with its own direct 
relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the 
people who sustain it and are governed by it’” (quoting U.S. Term Limits v. 
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995))).  
 239. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992) (“[W]hile 
the Tenth Amendment makes explicit that ‘the powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution . . . are reserved to the States respectively, or 
to the people’; the task of ascertaining the constitutional line between federal and 
state power has given rise to many [difficult Supreme Court] cases.”). 
 240. See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 11 (1995) (describing 
those who advocate strong central authority as nationalists and those who 
advocate substantial diffusion of authority between the federal government and 
the states as federalists). 
 241. See Weiser, supra note 231, at 665 (“In contrast to a dual federalism, 
cooperative federalism envisions a sharing of regulatory authority between the 
federal government and the states that allows states to regulate within a 
framework delineated by federal law.”). The standard argument is that 
cooperative federalism emerged from the regulatory programs of the New Deal. 
See id. at 669 (“Although these [New Deal] programs involved the sharing of 
funding, as opposed to regulatory authority, they put the concept of cooperative 
federalism on the map.”). However, there is also an argument that Gilded Age 
reforms laid the foundation. See KIMBERLEY S. JOHNSON, GOVERNING THE 
AMERICAN STATE: CONGRESS AND THE NEW FEDERALISM, 1877–1929, at 6 (2007) 
(tracing the emergence and development of cooperative federalism back to Gilded 
Age congressional policies). 
 242. See Heather K. Gerken, The Taft Lecture: Living Under Someone Else’s 
Law, 84 CIN. L. REV. 377, 380 (2016) (“If you were to read the U.S Reports, you’d 
probably miss the fact that ‘Our Federalism’ encompasses relations among the 
states as well as relations between the states and federal government. Vertical 
federalism is federalism as far as most people are concerned.”); Heather K. 
Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The Political Safeguards of Horizontal Federalism, 113 
MICH. L. REV. 57, 59 (2014) (“[C]ourts and scholars have neglected federalism’s 
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point of traditional federalists, states should have more power, not 
less, and not be shunted aside by federal power.243 That, most 
definitely, is not the effect of “our federalism” asserted in 
Nicastro.244 In Nicastro, a state court sought to entertain a tort 
action on behalf of one of its own citizens who had suffered a 
terrible injury.245 The federal government, acting through its 
judicial branch, stepped in to foreclose this exercise of state 
power.246 Rather than being enhanced, state power was 
eviscerated.247 
A. The Revival of State Sovereignty as a Concern 
Curiously, this limiting of state regulation has arisen because 
the Court has in recent years developed a tender regard for 
protecting state sovereignty. The Court starts from a premise that 
sees states as rivals, and the assertion of one state’s power as 
diminishing the power of a sister state.248 
                                                                                                     
horizontal dimensions.”). 
 243. See Holtzblatt, supra note 242, at 104 (“Sovereignty fans who write about 
vertical federalism look to the judiciary to preserve states’ ability to serve as rivals 
and competitors to the national government.”). 
 244. One explanation, of course, is that any abstract consideration of 
federalism is trumped by the Justice’s view of the desirability of civil litigation. 
See Brooke D. Coleman, Civil-izing Federalism, 89 TUL. L. REV. 307 (2014) 
(arguing that the Justices’ views in cases involving access to state courts reflect 
their views on civil litigation). But see Cassandra Burke Robertson & Charles W. 
Rhodes, The Business of Personal Jurisdiction, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 775, 
776 – 77 (2017) 
We find little evidence that the Court was motivated by a desire to 
favor business interests . . . . [I]t appears the Court was driven more 
by a commitment to formalist evaluation of individual cases and a 
generalized resistance to allowing United States courts to serve as a 
magnet forum for transnational litigation. 
 245. See Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 879 (“[T]he New Jersey Supreme Court 
concluded that New Jersey courts could exercise jurisdiction over [defendant] 
without contravention of the Due Process Clause.”). 
 246. See id. at 887 (failing to find the New Jersey courts to have jurisdiction 
over defendant). 
 247. See id. (“New Jersey is without power to adjudge the rights and liabilities 
of [defendant], and its exercise of jurisdiction would violate due process.”).  
 248. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878) (“The authority of every 
tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it 
is established. Any attempt to exercise authority beyond those limits would be 
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State sovereignty was built into the U.S. approach to personal 
jurisdiction from the beginning.249 In the landmark case of 
Pennoyer v. Neff,250 state jurisdiction was tied to the state’s 
territorial limits.251 Each state had “exclusive” jurisdiction over 
persons and property within its borders.252 The Court’s power could 
be viewed as being very much like a magic wand—capable of 
pulling into court anything within the state boundaries, but utterly 
without effect on the other side of the territorial line.253 
As was apparent even within Pennoyer, the absolute and 
exclusive sovereignty approach did not quite work.254 As the 
Pennoyer Court went to pains to make clear in dicta, citizens of a 
state remained under the power of the state’s courts no matter 
where they resided, even if that residence gave other states 
parallel and competing power over them; some proceedings such 
as divorce also required extraterritorial reach if a recalcitrant 
spouse refused to travel back to the state, again even though other 
states might also be able to exercise jurisdiction over the matter.255 
The territorialism issue became more problematic as the shift 
to a national, industrialized economy brought out-of-state 
corporations into the state to do business.256 Since corporations 
                                                                                                     
deemed . . . an illegitimate assumption of power, and be resisted as mere abuse.” 
(citing D’Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. 165, 175 (1851))). 
 249. See id. at 722 (“[E]very State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and 
sovereignty over persons and property within its territory . . . . [N]o State can 
exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its 
territory.”). 
 250. 95 U.S. 714 (1878). 
 251. See id. at 722 (“[E]very State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and 
sovereignty over persons and property within its territory.”). 
 252. Id. Even in Pennoyer, territorial exclusivity was not quite pure—an 
exception allowed for extraterritorial jurisdiction over citizens and over 
proceedings such as dissolution of a marriage formed in the state. Id. at 734–35. 
 253. See id. at 722–23 (explaining the elementary principle laid down by 
jurists that “no tribunal established by [a State] can extend its process beyond 
that territory so as to subject either persons or property to its decisions”). 
 254. See id. at 732 (“[A]s contracts made in one State may be enforceable only 
in another State, and property may be held by non-residents, the exercise of the 
jurisdiction which every State is admitted to possess over persons and property 
within its own territory will often affect persons and property without it.”). 
 255. See id. at 734–35 (enumerating the exceptions allowing for 
extraterritorial jurisdiction).  
 256. See, e.g., Green v. Chi., Burlington & Quincy Ry., 205 U.S. 530, 532–33 
(1907) (addressing the question of jurisdiction in a situation involving an 
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have no corporeal presence, the issue arose as to when a 
corporation could be deemed present in a state.257 This led to an 
increasingly awkward series of decisions in which activities in the 
state were assessed in order to determine “presence.”258 A major 
conceptual shift occurred with the landmark case of International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington.259 Discarding the fictions of presence, the 
court looked to the core due process issue, and grounded its 
analysis in whether the contacts with the state were such as to 
make pulling a defendant into court consistent with the 
fundamental fairness concerns embodied in due process.260 The 
emphasis shifted away from a preoccupation with presence within 
the borders of the state and toward a functional analysis based on 
fairness to the defendant.261 
For a while after International Shoe, it looked as if this 
approach might lead to something like national service of 
process.262 Jurisdiction was found even when the contacts with the 
state seemed attenuated.263 
The Court pushed back against this, however, in a series of 
decisions that reasserted the importance of specific ties to the 
                                                                                                     
interstate railroad).  
 257. See id. at 532 (“[The exercise of personal jurisdiction’s] validity depends 
upon whether the corporation was doing business in that district in such a 
manner and to such an extent as to warrant the inference that through its agents 
it was present there.”).  
 258. See, e.g., id. at 533–34; Int’l Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 
585–86 (1914). 
 259. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 260. See id. at 316–17 (“[T]he terms ‘present’ or ‘presence’ are used merely to 
symbolize those activities of the corporation’s agent within the state which courts 
will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process.”). 
 261. See id. (“[The demands of due process] may be met by such contacts of 
the corporation with the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context 
of our federal system of government, to require the corporation to defend the 
particular suit which is brought there.”). 
 262. See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (“Looking back over 
this long history of litigation [since Pennoyer] a trend is clearly discernible toward 
expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations 
and other nonresidents.”). 
 263. See, e.g., id. at 223–25 (finding jurisdiction even where defendant had 
not solicited or done any insurance business in the State apart from the policy 
involved).  
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forum.264 In Hanson v. Denckla,265 a battle between competing 
court systems for control over an estate plan was resolved by 
finding that a trustee could not be pulled into court in a state where 
the only link was that the trust donor had chosen after the 
establishment of the trust to move there.266 “Thrust upon” contacts 
were not enough.267 In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson,268 foreseeability that a car could wind up in Oklahoma 
was not enough to subject a local dealer to personal jurisdiction 
there.269 
In World-Wide Volkswagen, Justice White’s majority opinion 
had language that seemed to suggest that state sovereignty and 
associated territoriality were central to the analysis. White wrote: 
But the Framers also intended that the States retain many 
essential attributes of sovereignty, including, in particular, the 
sovereign power to try causes in their courts. The sovereignty of 
each State, in turn, implied a limitation on the sovereignty of 
all of its sister States—a limitation express or implicit in both 
the original scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth 
Amendment.270 
This seemed a major shift from an approach centered on 
fairness to the defendant that had dominated since International 
Shoe.271  
                                                                                                     
 264. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (failing to find 
sufficient ties to the forum and emphasizing that “it is essential in each case that 
there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege 
of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and 
protections of its laws”). 
 265. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).  
 266. See id. at 252 (“In contrast [with the facts of McGee], this action involves 
the validity of an agreement that was entered without any connection with the 
forum State.”). 
 267. See id. at 251 (“We fail to find such [minimum] contacts in the 
circumstances of this case.”). 
    268. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
 269. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298 (“It is foreseeable that the 
purchasers of automobiles sold by [defendant] may take them to Oklahoma. But 
the mere ‘unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a 
nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum 
State.’” (quoting Denckla, 357 U.S. at 253)). 
 270. Id. at 293. 
 271. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) (“To require 
the corporation in such circumstances to defend the suit away from its home or 
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In a subsequent decision, however, another opinion by Justice 
White rejected the idea of state sovereignty as driving the analysis, 
and centered it clearly on an individual liberty interest protected 
by the Due Process clause. 
The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects 
an individual liberty interest. It represents a restriction on 
judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of 
individual liberty. Thus, the test for personal jurisdiction 
requires that “the maintenance of the suit . . . not offend 
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”272 
In a footnote, the Court went on to be explicit that liberty 
interests alone underpinned personal jurisdiction doctrine: 
The restriction on state sovereign power described in 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., however, must be seen as 
ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved 
by the Due Process Clause. That Clause is the only source of the 
personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes 
no mention of federalism concerns. Furthermore, if the 
federalism concept operated as an independent restriction on 
the sovereign power of the court, it would not be possible to 
waive the personal jurisdiction requirement: Individual actions 
cannot change the powers of sovereignty, although the 
individual can subject himself to powers from which he may 
otherwise be protected.273 
As a personal right, the Court went on to hold, personal 
jurisdiction could be waived by the individual, which is not the case 
when the limitation goes to the power of a branch of government.274 
The Court thus drew a sharp distinction between subject matter 
jurisdiction, which is based on the limitations inherent in the 
Constitution on one branch of government (the federal courts), and 
personal jurisdiction, which it held goes not to institutional 
                                                                                                     
other jurisdiction where it carries on more substantial activities has been thought 
to lay too great and unreasonable a burden on the corporation to comport with 
due process.”). 
 272. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 
702 – 03 (1982) (internal citations omitted).  
 273. Id. at 703 n.10.  
 274. See id. at 703 (“Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction 
represents first of all an individual right, it can, like other such rights, be 
waived.”). 
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limitations and rivalries but only to the liberty interest of an 
individual.275 
Even without an explicit focus on sovereignty as an 
underpinning of personal jurisdiction, the holdings in Hanson and 
World-Wide Volkswagen underscored that borders were not 
irrelevant and that national jurisdiction was not in the 
cards276 — the inquiry remained one that looked at the defendant’s 
relationship with the forum state.277 The inquiry, however, seemed 
focused on the defendant’s relationship with the forum state, and 
not on concerns related to state rivalry.278 
For a time that seemed to be the end of it—personal 
jurisdiction was rooted in individual liberty, and not issues of rival 
state sovereignty, while paying due regard to the defendant’s 
connections with the forum state.279 As the Insurance Corp. of 
Ireland280 decision noted, that was consistent with a number of 
decisions about personal jurisdiction that had come down over the 
years.281 Plaintiffs filing a claim would submit to personal 
jurisdiction on counterclaims even if they had no connection with 
the jurisdiction other than filing suit,282  contracting parties not 
                                                                                                     
 275.  Id. at 704 (“[U]nlike subject-matter jurisdiction, which even an appellate 
court may review sua sponte, under Rule 12(h), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
‘[a] defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person . . . is waived’ if not timely raised 
in the answer or a responsive pleading.” (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h))).  
 276. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293 (“Nevertheless, we have 
never accepted the proposition that state lines are irrelevant for jurisdictional 
purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful to the principles of interstate 
federalism embodied in the Constitution.”). 
 277. See id. at 292 (explaining that “[t]he relationship between the defendant 
and the forum must be such that it is ‘reasonable . . . to require the corporation to 
defend the particular suit which is brought there’” (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 
317)).  
 278. See id. (omitting any discussion of state rivalry and instead emphasizing 
“the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive 
social policies”).   
 279. See supra notes 273–278 and accompanying text (arguing that personal 
jurisdiction goes not to state power limitations and rivalries, but ultimately is 
defined as a function of the liberty interest of an individual under the Due Process 
Clause). 
    280. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).  
 281. See id. at 702–03 (citing precedent and noting that “[the personal 
jurisdiction requirement] represents a restriction on judicial power not as a 
matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty”). 
 282. See, e.g., Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67–68 (1938) (“The plaintiff 
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imminently expecting litigation could submit to personal 
jurisdiction in a forum where they might not be subject to personal 
jurisdiction,283 and litigants would waive any right to assert 
personal jurisdiction if they were not timely in asserting the 
defense.284 
If the stakeholder in a personal jurisdiction dispute was a 
state, jealously preserving its power against rival states seeking to 
usurp its sovereignty, none of these results are self-evident.285 
Indeed, in the realm of subject matter jurisdiction, where the issue 
clearly is delimiting federal versus state judicial power, none of 
these results would hold—individuals are powerless to consent to 
subject matter jurisdiction because the concern has to do with 
institutional limitations.286 These results do make sense in the 
context of a doctrine concerned with the defendant’s liberty 
interests, with the stakeholder free to waive a doctrine that exists 
for her benefit.287 
The same can be said of the touchstone of minimum contacts 
analysis when looking at specific jurisdiction, which is whether the 
defendant purposefully availed itself of a connection with the 
                                                                                                     
having, by his voluntary act in demanding justice from the defendant, submitted 
himself to the jurisdiction of the court, there is nothing arbitrary or unreasonable 
in treating him as being there for all purposes for which justice to the defendant 
requires his presence.”). 
 283. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991) 
(validating a forum selection clause that limited choice of forum to a Florida 
district court that would not otherwise have personal jurisdiction over the 
plaintiff). 
 284. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2), 12(h)(1) (providing the manner in which 
personal jurisdiction can be waived by a defendant). 
 285. But see Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60 EMORY L.J. 1, 65 
n.261, 95 n.365 (2010) (arguing that under a nuanced view of jurisdiction, taking 
horizontal federalism concerns into account, a defendant could waive some bases 
for objecting to an assertion to jurisdiction (e.g., a liberty interest) while being 
unable to waive others (e.g., comity interests arising from state versus state 
conflicts)). As the law exists, however, the defendant’s waiver controls. 
 286. See id. at 12 (distinguishing discretionary decisions made by state courts 
from the “antecedent question of whether the Constitution limits the state’s 
discretion to make any forum available in suits against a particular defendant”).  
 287. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2), 12(h)(1) (permitting waiver by a defendant); 
see also Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 702 (stating that “the personal jurisdiction 
requirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest” (emphasis 
added)).  
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forum state.288 From the perspective of whether a forum is 
reasonable and fair, whether the defendant chose to have a 
relationship makes obvious sense. From the perspective of 
rivalrous state power, it is less self-evident that the test should be 
what jurisdiction a defendant had in mind when taking actions 
that later give rise to claims.  
Then came Nicastro.289 Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion 
gave short shrift to the long line of cases focused on individual 
liberty and asserted instead a theory of personal jurisdiction rooted 
in state sovereignty.290 He acknowledged the history, but used a 
bootstrap approach to reinvigorating sovereignty concerns: 
Personal jurisdiction, of course, restricts “judicial power not as 
a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty,” 
for due process protects the individual’s right to be subject only 
to lawful power. But whether a judicial judgment is lawful 
depends on whether the sovereign has authority to render it.291 
Kennedy’s view of state sovereignty adopted White’s earlier 
view that states are primarily rivals, and that assertion of 
jurisdiction by one state denigrates the sovereignty of others: 
“[a]nd if another State were to assert jurisdiction in an 
inappropriate case, it would upset the federal balance, which posits 
that each State has a sovereignty that is not subject to unlawful 
intrusion by other States.”292 
Despite reinvigorating sovereignty as a basis for limitations 
on personal jurisdiction, Kennedy continued to base his analysis 
on the familiar touchstone of purposeful availment. As he 
explained:  
Freeform fundamental fairness notions divorced from 
traditional practice cannot transform a judgment rendered 
without authority into law. As a general rule, the sovereign’s 
exercise of power requires some act by which the defendant 
“purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting 
                                                                                                     
 288. See generally Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 289. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011). 
 290. See id. at 880–84 (identifying the competing concerns of sovereign 
authority over fairness and foreseeability from past case law). 
 291. Id. at 884 (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie Des Bauites De Guinee, 
456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982)). 
 292. Id. 
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activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and 
protections of its laws.”293 
Under Kennedy’s approach, while not fully developed, it 
appears that the proper state to exercise jurisdiction over McIntyre 
was not New Jersey, where the machine was located and used, 
where the accident occurred, and where the injured claimant lived, 
but Ohio.294 Ohio was the state through which McIntyre imported 
its machines, and therefore a state which the British manufacturer 
had in mind when sending its machines to America.295 As a result, 
there presumably existed purposeful availment with regard to 
Ohio, a state with no other apparent connection to the controversy. 
In Kennedy’s view, it appears that the defendant’s purposeful 
availment of Ohio, and not New Jersey, made any assertion of 
power by New Jersey an encroachment upon Ohio’s sovereignty.296
 Kennedy’s approach was vigorously rejected in a dissent by 
Justice Ginsburg. She argued:  
New Jersey’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign 
manufacturer whose dangerous product caused a workplace 
injury in New Jersey does not tread on the domain, or diminish 
the sovereignty, of any sister State. Indeed, among States of the 
United States, the State in which the injury occurred would 
seem most suitable for litigation of a products liability tort 
claim.297 
Justice Ginsburg also noted that the jurisdiction New Jersey 
sought to exercise was not, under international norms, excessive 
or extravagant. 
The Court’s judgment also puts United States plaintiffs at a 
disadvantage in comparison to similarly situated complainants 
elsewhere in the world. Of particular note, within the European 
Union, in which the United Kingdom is a participant, the 
jurisdiction New Jersey would have exercised is not at all 
                                                                                                     
 293. Id. at 880 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). 
 294. See id. at 886–87 (remarking that “these facts may reveal an intent to 
serve the U.S market, but they do not show that J. McIntyre purposefully availed 
itself of the New Jersey market”). 
 295. Id. at 898. 
 296. See id. at 884 (“[I]f another State were to assert jurisdiction in an 
inappropriate case, it would upset the federal balance, which posits that each 
State has a sovereignty that is not subject to unlawful intrusion by other States.”). 
 297. Id. at 899. 
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exceptional. The European Regulation on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments provides for the 
exercise of specific jurisdiction “in matters relating to tort . . . in 
the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred.” The 
European Court of Justice has interpreted this prescription to 
authorize jurisdiction either where the harmful act occurred or 
at the place of injury.298 
Nicastro involved only a plurality decision, but similar state 
sovereignty language was adopted by a solid eight justice majority 
in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court. In this case, a 
national class action sought to address claims that a 
pharmaceutical product was defective.299 The case was filed in 
California, where Bristol- Myers was not subject to general 
jurisdiction post-Daimler as California was neither its state of 
incorporation nor the site of its headquarters.300 
The largest proportion of the plaintiff group was California 
residents.301 For them, as sales and marketing had taken place in 
California, specific jurisdiction existed.302 To this group, plaintiffs 
wished to add plaintiffs from multiple other states.303 In those 
cases, so far as the record showed, none of the actions giving rise 
to their alleged injuries were connected to California.304 The 
lawsuit therefore was one with a legitimate connection to 
California, but with additional plaintiffs with no California 
nexus.305 Put differently, unlike Daimler, this was not a case where 
                                                                                                     
 298. Id. at 909 (quoting 2001 O.J. (L 12) 4 (citing Case 21/76, Handelskwekerij 
G.J. Bier B.V. v. Mines de Potasse d’Alsace S.A., 1976 E.C.R. 1735)); see also id. 
at 1780 (labeling state sovereignty a primary consideration in determining 
whether personal jurisdiction is present). 
 299. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1778 
(2017). 
 300. See id. at 1781 (“Our settled principles regarding specific jurisdiction 
control this case.”); see also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 119 (2014) 
(“The paradigm all-purpose forums for general jurisdiction are a corporation’s 
place of incorporation and principal place of business.” (citing Goodyear Dunlop 
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011))).  
 301. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1778. 
 302. See id. at 1781 (acknowledging that California could assert specific 
jurisdiction on behalf of the in-state residents). 
 303. Id.  
 304. See id. at 1781 (noting the absence of a relevant link between California 
and the nonresident’s claims). 
 305. See id. (identifying a connection between defendant’s conduct and the 
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general jurisdiction brought a case with no California connection 
into a California court, but one with a connection to California and 
with defendants with significant connections to California who 
would have to defend an identical suit in California in any event, 
but connections that did not specifically include the out-of-state 
plaintiffs.306 
The greatest danger of general jurisdiction—that ongoing 
contacts with a state would make it a forum for unrelated litigation 
from across the globe with no relationship to the forum—was not 
raised by the facts in Bristol-Myers.307 The defendant had an 
ongoing connection with the forum that all agreed justified some 
kind of lawsuit in the forum, and the additional claims were 
factually and legally related to the claims that arose in 
California.308 Personal jurisdiction aside, the liberal joinder rules 
common in the U.S. clearly allow and even encourage the 
additional plaintiffs to join litigation so all claims could be tried in 
one proceeding.309 
On these facts, the lower court had applied a so-called “sliding 
scale” of specific jurisdiction, finding that since Bristol-Myers had 
engaged in extensive activities in California, a lesser level of nexus 
was required.310 The court rejected this as a back door approach to 
reviving the kind of broad “continuous contacts” general 
jurisdiction rejected in Daimler.311 The Court then looked to the 
                                                                                                     
California residents).    
 306. Compare id. (examining California’s exercise of jurisdiction over 
California residents and nonresidents), with Daimler, 571 U.S. at 117 
(considering a claim brought by twenty-two Argentinian nationals in California). 
 307. See generally Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1773. 
 308. See id. at 1781 (stating that the ability of third parties—the California 
residents—to bring similar claims is irrelevant).  
 309. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966), superseded 
by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2018) (identifying the broad scope of joinder of claims 
and explaining that “[u]nder the Rules, the impulse is toward entertaining the 
broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties . . . .”). 
 310. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 377 P.3d 874, 889 (Cal. 
2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (applying California’s sliding-scale test, which 
provides that extensive forum contacts will relax the requirements for 
demonstrating a connection to the forum).  
 311. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 
(2017) (limiting systematic activity of a corporation to questions of specific 
jurisdiction); see also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 119 (2014) (cabining 
the “continuous and systematic” inquiry to the exercise of specific jurisdiction 
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connection with the forum for the non-California plaintiffs, and, 
finding none, concluded that their lawsuit must be brought 
elsewhere.312 
Justice Alito’s opinion on behalf of an eight-justice majority 
staked its approach on sovereignty and territoriality concerns.313 
Quoting from Hanson and World-Wide Volkswagen, it reiterated 
that a state was diminished if another court asserted jurisdiction 
that went beyond its powers.314 The terms “liberty interest” and 
“fairness,” in contrast, appear nowhere in Justice Alito’s opinion.315  
The result in Bristol-Myers was, while not preordained, 
nonetheless not surprising. The plaintiffs dismissed from the 
action had no connection to California, and had their cases been 
brought as standalone cases there would have been no real 
argument that California was an appropriate setting for the 
litigation, whether as a matter of jurisdiction or of other doctrines 
such as venue.316 It was a short step to expand previous rulings 
requiring personal jurisdiction with regard to each defendant to 
requiring personal jurisdiction for each plaintiff. Moreover, to have 
held otherwise would have opened defendants up to nationwide 
classes in any location where some local plaintiffs could be found, 
which would have the effect (if the plaintiffs’ attorneys did their 
work properly) of locating all claims nationwide in an unfriendly 
forum.317 
                                                                                                     
(citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945))). 
 312. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1782 (concluding that California courts 
cannot claim specific jurisdiction). 
 313. See id. at 1780 (“The sovereignty of each State . . . implie[s] a limitation 
on the sovereignty of all its sister States.” (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. 
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980))). 
 314. See id. at 1780–81 (explaining that assertions of jurisdiction rooted in 
convenience result in the reciprocal divestment of another State’s power). 
 315. Id. at 1777–84. 
 316. Id. at 1782. 
 317. While many cases and commentators tend to pose the liberty interest 
issue with regard to an improper forum in terms of convenience, the real issue for 
corporate defendants may be that of multiplication of possible forums, with the 
resulting likelihood that litigation can be located in unfriendly venues. For an 
international company capable of doing business worldwide, it seems unlikely 
that suit in one state versus another would be so inconvenient from a logistics 
standpoint as to matter, especially in today’s digital, globalized, outsourced world. 
Vendors will be found to handle document production and discovery; files will be 
exchanged, almost all electronically. Resolution will come in time. There is a 
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Somewhat surprisingly Justice Alito grounded the opinion in 
terms of state sovereignty.318 The kind of due process, fundamental 
fairness analysis employed up until Nicastro could have identified 
a lack of fundamental fairness in exposing a defendant to a 
national class action in an unfriendly state because of contacts 
with just one state.319 The shift to an emphasis on sovereignty, 
supported by eight justices, was a different and not inevitable 
path. 
A vigorous dissent from Justice Sotomayor questioned the 
majority’s reliance on territorial based sovereignty:  
The majority’s animating concern, in the end, appears to be 
federalism: “[T]erritorial limitations on the power of the 
respective States,” we are informed, may—and today 
do — trump even concerns about fairness to the parties. Indeed, 
the majority appears to concede that this is not, at bottom, a 
case about fairness but instead a case about power: one in which 
“the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from 
being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State . . . 
the forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to the 
controversy; [and] the forum State is the most convenient 
location for litigation” but personal jurisdiction still will not 
lie.320  
                                                                                                     
palpable unfairness, however, to being required to stand trial at whichever venue 
is the most unfriendly to the defendant, whether or not that venue has any 
relationship at all to the dispute. Choice of law rules might  — or might 
not — protect against local laws that are skewed against the defendant, but that 
does not address the issue of unfriendly jury or judicial venires, and experienced 
trial lawyers are quick to claim that the composition of the jury can be outcome 
determinative. Expanding the choice of forums systematically disadvantages 
defendants positioning litigation—and the opportunity for making 
precedents — in particularly unfriendly forums. See Daniel Klerman, Rethinking 
Personal Jurisdiction, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 245, 247–48 (2014) (discussing issue 
of local bias); Stephen E. Sachs How Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction, 
108 NW. L. REV. 1301, 1324 (2014) (discussing “judicial hellholes”); see also 
Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 U. S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 250–70 
(2016) (discussing use of Eastern District of Texas as a preferred plaintiffs’ forum 
for patent disputes). 
 318. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780. 
 319. See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) 
(grounding personal jurisdiction considerations in “traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice” (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))).  
 320. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1788 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980)). 
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Seeing little reason to apply this principle against a large 
corporate defendant for conduct that was national in nature and 
scope, Sotomayor then went on to put her finger on the key 
question that was unasked by the majority: “What interest could 
any single State have in adjudicating respondents’ claims that the 
other States do not share?”321  
The view taken in the Nicastro plurality and Bristol-Myers 
masks this issue by viewing states primary as rivals and 
competitors.322 By focusing on rivalry, rather than shared 
interests, the sovereignty analysis as it is being developed sees 
states not as partners in a common scheme of governance but as 
adversaries jealous of their rights and prerogatives. 
After Nicastro and Bristol-Myers, state sovereignty seems 
clearly to be resurrected as a central consideration where personal 
jurisdiction is concerned.323 Viewing states first and foremost as 
rivals, and eager to protect against the implicit diminution that 
might come from another state asserting jurisdiction, the Court 
has proved willing to engage in the explicit diminution of telling 
states that they cannot entertain actions they would be willing to 
hear.324 The current status shows at least a portion of the Court 
very concerned with this view of sovereignty: a view which 
abstractly protects state privileges while actively and directly 
eviscerating the power of a state judicial system to act. 
                                                                                                     
 321. Id. 
 322. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880–81 (2011) 
(likening the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the exercise of state authority); 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) 
(majority opinion) (“The sovereignty of each State . . . implie[s] a limitation on the 
sovereignty of all its sister States.” (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980))). 
 323. See Scott Dodson, Jurisdiction in the Trump Era, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 
73, 83 (2018) (“Bristol-Myers Squibb is a particularly important case because it 
continues Walden’s erosion of more relaxed relationships between the forum, the 
claim, and the defendant and because it seems to validate the Nicastro plurality’s 
reinvigoration of state sovereignty.”). 
 324.  See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 
(1980) (“[T]he Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate 
federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid 
judgment.”). 
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B. “Purposeful Availment” as an Inherently Flawed Analytical 
Approach Towards State Sovereignty Concerns 
The particular justification for this evisceration in Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion was that the interests of another, unnamed 
state might be impaired if New Jersey were allowed to 
overreach.325 While, in theory, this can make sense, it has a curious 
flavor on the facts of Nicastro. In Nicastro, after all, the tort 
occurred in New Jersey, and the party injured was a New Jersey 
citizen.326 As Justice Ginsberg noted, most courts worldwide would 
not hesitate to assert jurisdiction on similar facts.327 
Animating Justice Kennedy’s concern, it appears, is a kind of 
“horizontal” federalism that looks to relationships among the 
states.328 Horizontal federalism, while perhaps less categorically 
articulated in the cases than the familiar vertical federalism, is 
indeed inherent in the Constitution and built in to the way the 
various components of the federal government work.329 That states 
are limited in their reach by their territory—or more broadly, by 
some interest or set of consequences related to the state 
territory — is an animating assumption of the federal system.330 
The concern that one state not interfere with the territorial 
sovereignty of another is not entirely misplaced, of course. For 
example, if Illinois were to routinely send its highway patrol across 
the border into Indiana to enforce, say, driving while intoxicated 
laws, Indiana would have a legitimate grievance, even if such 
enforcement could be shown to stop drunken drivers before they 
could cross into Illinois. 
                                                                                                     
 325.  See Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 884 (noting that the federal balance depends 
upon each State’s undisturbed sovereignty). 
 326. Id. at 877.  
 327. Id. at 909 (quoting 2001 O.J. (L 12) 4) (citing Case 21/76, 
Handelskwekerij G.J. Bier B.V. v. Mines de Potasse d’Alsace S.A., 1976 E.C.R. 
1735). 
 328.  See, e.g., Erbsen, supra note 234, at 494 (defining “horizontal federalism” 
as the coordination of the boundaries of coequal states). 
 329. Id. at 497 (describing “horizontal federalism” as a “potentially coherent 
field of law lurking amidst [the Constitution’s] components usually viewed in 
isolation”).  
 330. Id. (discussing the ways in which the Constitution creates inherent 
limits on state power).  
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Extending horizontal federalism concerns to the courts also is 
neither new nor inherently troubling. If states are limited in their 
reach outside their community, it makes sense for litigation—and 
regulation by litigation—to be included in those limits. Theories of 
regulatory legitimacy require some connection between the 
community imposing its standards and those subject to the 
imposition.331 
Where it becomes odd, and it becomes very odd, is when a rival 
state is viewed as the principal stakeholder, and the inquiry is 
grafted into an analytical structure that for the past half century 
has claimed to largely be about individual liberty interests.332 
Purposeful availment makes sense as the motivating engine of 
minimum contacts when the core of the inquiry is the defendant’s 
liberty interest, and the test is whether it is fair and reasonable to 
drag that defendant into a distant forum.333 If the defendant has 
chosen in some knowing way to build a relationship with a forum, 
it can hardly seem unfair or unreasonable to make him answer in 
court for violations related to that relationship and those 
contacts.334 
However, in Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Nicastro and Justice 
Alito’s in Bristol- Myers purposeful availment continued to be the 
touchstone for an analysis that seemed to be motivated less by 
concern about liberty interests than about rivalrous state power.335 
States have a structural interest in other states not overreaching 
                                                                                                     
 331.  See Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the 
Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 689 (1987) (asserting that 
legitimate exercises of jurisdiction should reflect the general limits of state 
sovereignty). 
 332. See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 
694, 702–03 (1982) (“The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and 
protects an individual liberty interest.”).  
 333. See id. at 703 (requiring “the maintenance of suit . . . not offend 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945))). 
 334. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (stating that 
the privilege of conducting certain activities within a state may justifiably give 
rise to obligations in connection with those activities). 
 335. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 885 (2011) 
(characterizing inappropriately exercised state sovereignty as an upset to the 
federal balance); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 
1780 (2017) (including state sovereignty as a “primary concern” in determining 
whether personal jurisdiction is present). 
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their proper space,336 but Kennedy tried to set the boundaries 
between states based on a test that in the end focuses on little more 
than the defendant’s antecedent state of mind.337 
The focus on “purposeful availment” shifts the exercise of this 
kind of horizontal federalism away from a state’s structural 
interest vis-à-vis other states, and onto the unpredictable and 
inherently unprincipled question of “what state was the defendant 
thinking about when it put a product into the stream of 
commerce?”338 If one is looking to balance the interests of two 
states with regard to which should be able to host a lawsuit 
involving an injury, which state a foreign defendant years or 
decades before purposefully wanted a relationship with seems an 
odd way to draw the boundary. It substitutes inherently subjective 
thought processes on the part of potential defendants339 for 
structural concerns when deciding which state, under the federal 
scheme, has the most connection to the lawsuit, and whether any 
other states have a reason to resist the assertion of jurisdiction.340 
In Nicastro, for example, a New Jersey resident was injured 
by a machine sold into New Jersey and operated in New Jersey.341 
What trumped New Jersey’s power to litigate a New Jersey centric 
dispute over whether the machine was safe, in the eyes of the 
plurality, were marketing plans made decades before by the 
British manufacturer.342 Because there was no showing that the 
                                                                                                     
 336. Some commentators agree, and agree with the notion that rival states 
are aggrieved. See Erbsen, supra note 285, at 38–60 (arguing for state interest 
and importance of state borders); Parry, supra note 134, at 855 (protecting 
individual interests in personal jurisdiction analysis also protects the sovereign 
interests of other states); Stein, supra note 331, at 710–11 (“It remains offensive 
to the federal system, and accordingly to the individual defendant, for a state 
without a legitimate regulatory claim to assert authority.”). 
 337. See Jeffrey M. Schmitt, Rethinking the State Sovereignty Interest in 
Personal Jurisdiction, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 769 (2016) (arguing that 
Justice Kennedy would have found jurisdiction over the defendant in Nicastro 
only if J. McIntyre had specifically targeted New Jersey). 
 338.  See Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 885 (requiring defendant engage in conduct 
directed at a specific state). 
 339. See Schmitt, supra note 337, at 769 (“The purposeful availment 
requirement, for example, is tied to the subjective intentions of the defendant 
rather than the sovereign power of the states.”). 
 340. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 341. Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 878.  
 342. See id. at 886 (requiring a showing that the manufacturer purposefully 
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British defendant, who all agreed was targeting the entire U.S. 
market, happened to attend a trade show in New Jersey, or buy an 
advertisement specifically aimed at New Jersey, or otherwise 
evince an interest in New Jersey greater than in other states, New 
Jersey was shunted aside in its power to hear the dispute in favor 
of those other states with no current connection to the dispute, but 
whose territories were actively in the mind of the defendant as it 
prepared to sell into the U.S. market.343 
To the extent the concern is horizontal federalism, moreover, 
it’s not clear why the Court treats personal jurisdiction as a perfect 
proxy for the state comity concerns that can arise under horizontal 
federalism.344 If a state could have objections to another state 
hearing a lawsuit in which it has an interest, it would seem likely 
that personal jurisdiction is only one of many situations where that 
might arise. Imagine, for example, a case in which a New York 
state court is asked to hear a case that will require analysis of an 
unresolved issue of Delaware corporate law, with both the plaintiff 
and defendant being Delaware domiciliaries, and with the 
defendant having expressly waived personal jurisdiction and 
venue defenses. Delaware might care more about keeping 
interpretation of its legal code in its own courts than it does about 
inconvenience to its domiciliary, but no likely vehicle exists for 
asserting that interest. 
In other cases—and Nicastro seems a prime example—the 
“other” state that can claim purposeful availment may have little 
interest in the litigation at all. Imagine a case with facts like 
Nicastro, where the defendant is not now and never has been 
domiciled in its state, its own law will under no circumstances be 
applicable, and its superior claim to the lawsuit exists only because 
of a purpose formed, perhaps unbeknownst to the forum state, 
through the thoughts and unilateral actions of the defendant, with 
no state involvement. In such a case, however, as in Nicastro, if the 
defendant asserts its rights, “our federalism” takes the case away 
                                                                                                     
availed itself of the New Jersey market). 
 343. See id. (“[I]t is [the manufacturer’s] purposeful contacts with New Jersey, 
not with the United States, that alone are relevant.”). 
 344.  See Erbsen, supra note 285, at 89–96 (discussing the utility of a comity 
rule within jurisdictional inquiries). 
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from the site of the tort and the home of the plaintiff to a state with 
at best a glancing connection to the dispute. 
These are not the kinds of issues Justice Kennedy examined 
in waving a hand towards our federalism. Indeed, exactly how 
purposeful availment relates to horizontal allocation of state power 
was not a topic Justice Kennedy addressed. He was clear, however, 
that the lack of such subjective focus on the state was sufficient to 
strip a state of its adjudicative power, and to make illegal any 
judgment rendered.345 
To the extent the Court’s sudden emphasis on state 
sovereignty reflects just another zig in the Court’s zigzagging 
search for a rationale underlying personal jurisdiction, binding 
only until the next case takes a different tack, perhaps it is of little 
consequence.346 As one scholar has noted:  
The Supreme Court has similarly been unable to articulate a 
stable method for addressing disputes about personal 
jurisdiction. Doctrine vacillates along multiple dyads: 
sometimes emphasizing state sovereignty and other times 
emphasizing individual rights, sometimes focusing on a state’s 
power over actors and other times on power arising from the 
local effects of their actions, and sometimes relying on a rule’s 
historical pedigree and other times discounting it. Likewise, the 
Court has unhelpfully opined that the forum state’s interests in 
providing a forum matter except when they don’t, that burdens 
on nonresident defendants are material except when they 
aren’t, and that the plaintiff’s interest in finding a convenient 
forum is important except when it isn’t.347 
To the extent the Court seriously intends going forward to 
assert a horizontal state sovereignty version of “our federalism” 
while still employing a purposeful availment analysis—and 
Bristol-Myers suggests that this is exactly where the court is 
headed—it raises serious questions about how the Court views 
federalism. In addition, the emphasis on protecting states from 
                                                                                                     
 345.  See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 883–85 (2011) 
(drawing no connection between purposeful availment the and the federalist 
system of government). 
 346. See George Rutherglen, Personal Jurisdiction and Political Authority, 32 
J.L. & POL. 1, 1 (2016) (“This ambiguity in theory has led to deleterious 
consequences in practice by forcing together the disparate elements of sovereignty 
and individual rights into the more specific tests for personal jurisdiction.”).  
 347. See Erbsen, supra note 285, at 4–5.  
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concurrent exercises of power by other states with a connection to 
the matter suggests a view of state relations drawn primarily from 
international relations among independent sovereigns, a view that 
is at fundamental odds with the “more perfect union” created by 
the Constitution.348 
A certain level of concurrency is built into the Constitutional 
system. At one level, of course, citizens are subject to both state 
and federal power.349 Beyond that, it is not exceptional for more 
than one state to be able to exercise over a party based on one 
pattern of conduct.350 For example, that one state brings criminal 
charges does not prevent another state with a nexus from bringing 
charges that would be barred in the original state by the double 
jeopardy charge.351 Similarly, a citizen travelling or even residing 
outside her home state might be subject to both home state and 
host state regulation, even if the applicable rules conflict.352 While 
the boundaries of concurrent assertions of power depend on the 
facts and can be open to debate, there is no question that 
overlapping assertions of power are a basic feature of the federal 
system.353 
The approach adopted by the plurality in Nicastro and the 
Court in Bristol-Myers, however, argues that states are diminished 
when other states exercise concurrent power.354 This concern 
                                                                                                     
 348. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 349. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 350. See, e.g., Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 93 (1985) (“A State’s interest in 
vindicating its sovereign authority through enforcement of its laws by definition 
can never be satisfied by another State’s enforcement of its own laws.” (emphasis 
in original)). 
 351. Id.  
 352. See Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity, 150 
U. PA. L. REV. 855, 856 (2002) (arguing that states have the presumptive power 
to regulate the activity of their citizens). 
 353. See id. (“Such diversity among polities is one of frequently heralded 
benefits of our federal system.” (citing Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, 
Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1558 
(2000))). Some scholars, such as Professor Brilmayer, argue for Constitutional 
rules that limit concurrency in at least some settings. See Lea Brilmayer, 
Interstate Preemption: The Right to Travel, the Right to Life, and the Right to Die, 
91 MICH. L. REV. 873, 876 (1993) (“[T]he structure of our federal system clearly 
compels the priority of the territorial state, and . . . this priority typically 
invalidates the residence state’s claim to regulate.”). Others, such as Rosen, argue 
for accepting concurrency as a feature of the system.  
 354. See Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 884 (2011) (“[I]f another State were to assert 
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inspires the Court to strip states of power to adjudicate, even when 
the litigation has some real relationship to the forum. 
At one level, if this kind of horizontal federalism is to become 
the driving concern behind personal jurisdiction doctrine, the test 
and the analysis should fit the focus. Rather than looking at which 
jurisdiction a defendant preferred to have a relationship with, an 
inherently defendant-focused inquiry, the emphasis should shift to 
which state has the best claim—or least a justifiable claim—to host 
the litigation. In this regard, what state the defendant proposed to 
have a relationship with will not be the only interest, or the best 
guide.355 Beyond that, however, is the question of whether 
horizontal federalism as it operates really is a zero-sum game. 
C. The Reality of Cooperative, Polycentric Federalism 
In assessing the Court’s summary invocation of “our 
federalism,” a fundamental question of whether the Court’s view 
of jealous rivals who are best viewed as independent sovereigns is 
the best approach. Even giving horizontal federalism full due, and 
even assuming that a Court bent on making horizontal federalism 
the core concern of personal jurisdiction can come up with a better 
test than purposeful availment, the situation is not so simple as 
two unconnected sovereigns living side by side. As a matter of 
fundamental law, states are not independent sovereigns, but 
members of a common union.356 As a practical matter, it would do 
Illinois no good, and much harm, if Indiana were to become a 
                                                                                                     
jurisdiction in an inappropriate case, it would upset the federal balance. . . .”); 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1778 (2017) 
(discussing how the sovereignty of each state limits the sovereignty of other 
states). 
 355. Some scholars, in line with this, see the Dormant Commerce Clause, 
rather than Due Process, as the most appropriate source of Constitutional power 
to limit assertions of personal jurisdiction. See Chad DeVeaux, Lost in the Dismal 
Swamp: Interstate Class Actions, False Federalism, and the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 999 (2011) (“The dormant Commerce Clause, 
not due process, is offended by [state overreaching].”). 
 356. See Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935) (“The 
Constitution was framed under the dominion of a political philosophy less 
parochial in range. It was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several 
states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and 
salvation are in union and not division.”). 
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lawless jungle. The repose of the citizens of any state depends 
substantially on the stability and orderliness of its neighboring 
states. Put differently, putting the Indiana courts out of business 
on the theory that they might intrude on legitimate Illinois 
assertions of sovereignty is not inexorably to Illinois’s benefit. 
Beyond that, “our federalism” as it has evolved shows 
neighboring states pursuing largely parallel and consistent 
systems of law.357 A car fit to drive in Indiana—with working 
headlights and tail lights, for example—is likely to be fit to drive 
under the laws applicable in Illinois. Both states have adopted 
versions of the Uniform Commercial Code to govern the sale of 
goods, leading to largely consistent if not identical rules.358 
Doctrines such as full faith and credit assume, and succeed, 
because notwithstanding some differences, the legal regimes in the 
various sovereign states follow a largely common model and 
pursue largely compatible ends. 359 Beyond that, to the extent the 
question boils down to one of community, and the legitimacy of 
applying a community’s rules to an outsider, it should be 
remembered that all states ultimately are members of the same 
sovereignty and same overarching community, that of the United 
States, and due weight should be given to that integrated 
community before sending litigants to wholly foreign legal 
systems. 
Differences exist from state to state, of course, but when the 
result of the Supreme Court’s denying jurisdictional reach is 
perhaps to force litigants to pursue claims against overseas 
defendants in overseas jurisdictions, these differences should not 
be exaggerated. A foreign country is, indeed, a separate sovereign, 
perhaps operating under a very different system of laws. Another 
state is a co-equal member of the same federal union and of the 
same sovereign community, applying laws that spring from the 
same sources and that for a number of reasons tend to be more 
                                                                                                     
 357. See Andrew Karch, The States and American Political Development, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 365, 378 
(Richard Valelly et al. eds., 2016) (highlighting the fundamental similarities of 
states). 
 358. See Table of Jurisdictions Listing Uniform Acts Adopted, in Directory of 
Uniform Acts and Codes U.L.A. 9, 31 & n.1 (1994 Pamphlet).  
 359. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 234, at 1 (identifying constitutional doctrines 
that unite the states).  
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alike than not.360 Indirect means such as standardization, 
horizontal diffusion of law, adoption of common model codes, as 
well as direct means such as compliance with federal standards, 
tend to spread a base level of commonality across states. 361 While 
differences are real, and can matter, the tendency of lawyers and 
law professors to spot distinctions and draw lines should not 
obscure the degree to which those distinctions reside in largely 
parallel systems that exist within a shared political community.362 
While each state has an interest in maintaining a zone of 
sovereignty, it also has an interest—an interest implicit in the very 
“more perfect union”363 asserted in the preamble as the reason for 
the Constitution and in the political community created by that 
Constitution—in acting in ways that cooperate with364 and 
reinforce governance norms in neighboring states.365 States can 
and do differ, and differ in consequential ways, but at least as 
importantly they function in mutually reinforcing ways.366 
                                                                                                     
 360. See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911) (“‘This Union’ was and is a 
union of States, equal in power, dignity, and authority, each competent to exert 
that residuum of sovereignty not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution itself.”).  
 361. See Karch, supra note 357, at 376 (“In devising social policies, the states 
interact not only with the national government but also with each other. 
Observers have long marveled at the spread of innovative programs from state to 
state.”). 
 362. See Charles D. Tarlton, Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements of 
Federalism: A Theoretical Speculation, 27 J. POL. 861, 861 (1965) (discussing the 
symmetrical characteristics of the federal system).  
 363. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 364. The Court identified an example of this in Keeton, where it noted that 
the “single publication rule” involved cooperation and shared interests across 
multiple states. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 777 (1984) 
(“New Hampshire also has a substantial interest in cooperating with other States, 
through the ‘single publication rule,’ to provide a forum for efficiently litigating 
all issues and damage claims arising out of a libel in a unitary proceeding.”). 
 365. See Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 242, at 112 (“[M]ost interstate 
interactions involve cooperation, not conflict.”); Harold Hongju Koh, 
Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 199–200 (1996) (arguing that 
states cooperate as well as compete, with compliance with norms being a winning 
strategy in a reiterated prisoner’s dilemma game); see generally Note, To Form a 
More Perfect Union?: Federalism and Informal Interstate Cooperation, 102 HARV. 
L. REV. 842 (1989) (discussing formal and informal cooperation between state 
officials such as attorney generals). 
 366. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 234, at 1 (“These horizontal relations may be 
cooperative as manifested by interstate compacts, uniform state laws, reciprocity 
statutes, administrative agreements, and regional and national associations of 
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Governance works not just through coercive power, but through 
voluntary adoption of common norms.367 
To some degree, the commonality is required by the 
Constitution.368 The Supremacy Clause requires states to yield to 
federal power when there is a conflict in an area where the federal 
government is empowered and has chosen to act.369 In this regard, 
states often have little choice but to cooperate with federal 
programs and initiatives. The incorporation of most of the Bill of 
Rights against the states creates other areas of commonality.370 
Notwithstanding state preferences, the Constitutional mandate 
demands compatible rules.  
Congressional actions can also lead to convergence of state 
laws and policies. Federal preemption can override areas where 
states choose divergent paths, and so the threat of preemption can 
nudge states toward consistent policies.371 In other areas, states 
adopt local versions of federal laws (such as Little FTC Acts or 
state antitrust acts), with the common federal template leading to 
similarity.372 
But beyond that there is much voluntary commonality.373 The 
nearly universal adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code is not 
                                                                                                     
state government officers.”). 
 367. See Paul Schiff Berman, Federalism and International Law Through the 
Lens of Legal Pluralism, 73 MO. L. REV. 1149, 1150 (2008) (“[R]ational choice 
understandings of how international law works or pure theory debates about 
sovereignty are limited because they focus too heavily on coercive power, thereby 
giving insufficient attention to the role of rhetorical persuasion, informal 
articulations of legal norms, and networks of affiliation that may not possess 
literal enforcement power.”). 
 368. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 234, at 1 (listing constitutional doctrines 
that compel commonality between the states).  
 369. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (commanding that the laws of the United 
States “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any Thing in the Constitution 
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”); see also Lorillard 
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001) (identifying the ways in which the 
express will of Congress preempts state action). 
 370. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 746 n.12, 764–65, 765 
n.13 (2010) (providing the incorporated provisions of the Bill of Rights).  
 371. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 234, at 212 (“If states fail to exercise their 
reserved powers in a cooperative manner to replace the labyrinth of conflicting 
laws impeding commerce by harmonizing their civil statutes, Congress will 
continue to preempt their regulatory authority.”). 
 372. Id. 
 373. See Judith Resnik, Federalism(s)’ Forms and Norms: Contesting Rights, 
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required by any federal mandate, but it allows each state to 
operate effectively in national commerce.374 To the extent there are 
local flavors—and there are—they exist within a common 
structure that has been voluntarily adopted.375 The UCC is just one 
of many uniform statutes with national and near national reach.376 
Beyond the UCC, state courts choose to follow the Restatements, 
or adopt legal rules first advanced by sister states.377 
Formal and informal organizations also lead to diffusion of 
policies across state lines.378 Organizations such as the National 
Association of Attorney Generals or the Conference of Chief 
Justices establish relationships across state lines, which in turn 
can lead to influence. Nongovernmental organizations, such as the 
                                                                                                     
De-essentializing Jurisdictional Divides, and Temporizing Accommodations, in 
FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY 403–05 (James E. Fleming & Jacob T. Levy eds., 
2014) (discussing how translocal organizations of government actors coordinate 
formally and informally to homogenize policy); Judith Resnik, Joshua Civin & 
Joseph Frueh, Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level: Sovereigntism, Federalism, and 
Translocal Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAs), 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 709, 
710 (2008) (discussing cooperative state and local action on climate change 
issues). 
 374. See Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of 
Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 132 (1996) (observing that State 
laws tend to be uniform where uniformity serves economic efficiency, but in some 
cases economically inefficient laws gain adoption due to authority of process); 
John Linarelli, The Economics of Uniform Laws and Uniform Lawmaking, 48 
WAYNE L. REV. 1387, 1392 (2003) (arguing that “economic analysis supports 
public policy in favor of unification of law if certain conditions, outlined in the 
article, are met”); see generally Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 
49 UCLA L. REV. 789 (2002) (exploring “friction” costs of changing legal rules). 
 375. See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of 
Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1557 (describing state 
authority as subject to yet distinct from national authority). 
 376. See Uniform Commercial Code, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, 
https://perma.cc/27NA-TECD (last visited Feb. 12, 2020) (providing background 
on the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 377. See Karch, supra note 357, at 376 (describing the interactions between 
states in devising new policy). 
 378. It has been argued that at an international level, the diffusion of 
concerns and answers across decentralized networks of regulators facing similar 
concerns plays a key role in international cooperation. See Kal Raustiala, The 
Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the 
Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (2002). 
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American Law Institute, can play a similar role, even absent 
formal actions.379 
There is so much consistency across state lines, and so much 
consistency that by its nature provides no cause for controversy or 
litigation, that it can be easy to overlook the deep structural 
importance of this commonality.380 It is worth remembering that 
one legal issue on which the states differed deeply, the legality of 
human chattel slavery, created unsustainable divisions in a 
structure that implicitly assumes high levels of common cause.381 
Given this deep similarity, one has to ask, as Justice 
Sotomayor asked: how much is a state injured if another state 
enforces a legal duty very much like that carried on the state’s own 
books?382 Even if one could identify the state deprived of its right 
to host a lawsuit, does it care? Should it care? 
Even if a state might care about another state’s hosting of a 
lawsuit, the question remains whether constitutionalized 
intervention by the federal judicial branch is the best way to 
address the issue. Constitutionalizing due process standards in a 
                                                                                                     
 379. See Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal 
Federalism and Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal 
Internationalism, 57 EMORY L.J. 31, 44 (2007) 
These various organizations, including the National League of Cities, 
the United States Conference of Mayors, the National Conference of 
State Legislatures, the National Governors’ Association, the National 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and the National Conference 
of Chief Justices of State Courts, are conduits for border crossings, both 
state-to-state and internationally. 
Judith Resnik, Afterword: Federalism’s Options, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 465, 
477–78 (1996) 
Be it state compacts, ad hoc regulatory arrangements of a group of 
states (sometimes prompted by or in response to federal regulation), 
mechanisms to adopt uniform laws, or the creation of new 
organizations to affect national political and legal life, actors—in and 
out of government—are trying an array of arrangements to respond to 
both new and old problems. 
 380. See Resnik, supra note 373, at 373 (describing the United States as 
“exemplifying” federalism symmetry).  
 381. Harry N. Scheiber, Redesigning the Architecture of Federalism—An 
American Tradition: Modern Devolution Policies in Perspective, 14 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 227, 237 (1996) (discussing how federalism not only protected slavery 
but went on to perpetuate racial segregation and discrimination).  
 382. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1788 
(2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (identifying no unique interest among the 
states potentially interested in this litigation).   
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rapidly evolving world places issues beyond political debate. Given 
that states have shown that they know how to cooperate and how 
to seek political help when cooperation fails, it’s not clear that the 
Court’s tender concern about hypothetical conflicts serves anyone’s 
interests.383 
These issues are heightened when the defendant comes from 
outside the borders of the United States, but has chosen to act 
within the U.S.384 In a case such as Nicastro, should hypothetical 
internal rivalries result in cancelling assertions of U.S. sovereignty 
against foreign defendants?385 In some cases, the state specific 
targeting required under Justice Kennedy’s approach in Nicastro 
would leave a foreign defendant immune from suit—and hence 
beyond U.S. regulation via litigation—anywhere in the United 
States.386 
The analysis is not helped by the Court’s summary invocation 
of sovereignty with no exploration of what that entails. 
Sovereignty, as quickly becomes apparent after even the briefest 
examination of the literature, is a slippery and difficult term. Even 
in the context of free-standing international states, what exactly 
we mean by sovereignty quickly proves elusive.387 
                                                                                                     
 383. See Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 242, at 111–12 
[T]he social science confirms what politics has shown. In many areas, 
there are robust, cooperative networks among federal, state, and local 
officials that can and do safeguard horizontal federalism. The 
horizontal parts of these networks provide the fora needed for states to 
work out the conflict for themselves. And the vertical dimensions of 
these networks allow state and local officials in conflict to pull in a 
national referee when they need one without regularly resorting to the 
courts. 
 384. See Lilly, supra note 156, at 85–86 (“The concerns of interstate 
federalism that apparently motivate strict limits upon state adjudicatory power 
are most questionable when invoked by an alien defendant.”). 
 385.  J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011). 
 386. See Patrick J. Borchers, Extending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
4(k)(2): A Way to (Partially) Clean Up the Personal Jurisdiction Mess, 67 AM. U. 
L. REV. 413, 418 (2017) (“[S]ome foreign defendants can benefit commercially 
from the U.S. market yet avoid suit in any U.S. court . . . .”). 
 387. See ROBERT JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY: EVOLUTION OF AN IDEA xi–xii 
(2007) (“The idea of sovereignty is a big idea. It defies academic attempts to pin 
it down and fit it into tidy analytical categories. When we think we have managed 
that feat we discover another angle or dimension of the subject that we have not 
considered.”); Hent Kalmo & Quentin Skinner, Introduction, A Concept in 
Fragments, in SOVEREIGNTY IN FRAGMENTS: THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF 
A CONTESTED CONCEPT 1 (Hent Kalmo & Quentin Skinner eds., 2010) (“The 
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That problem of elusiveness only becomes more pronounced in 
the context of the U.S. federal system.388 As the Constitutional 
preamble reminds us, the U.S. government is at its core a union — a 
coalition, a joining of forces and interests.389 In that union, states 
retain some elements of independent sovereignty while 
simultaneously being full constituent parts of the sovereign 
union.390 
The sovereignty discussion has tended to focus attention on 
the degree to which states retain independent control.391 In some 
ways this makes sense—litigation tends to focus on boundary 
situations where there is some rivalrous contesting for control, 
whether between a state and the federal government, or between 
two states.392 The legal academy’s focus on reported cases tends to 
center interest on those aspects of sovereignty that are legally 
actionable.393 
But, in other ways, this discussion obscures a deeper reality of 
sovereignty in our federal system. As noted above, portraying the 
states as jealous adversaries presents at best an incomplete 
picture of how they relate—much as focusing exclusively on the 
squabbles of married couples would obscure that they are 
nonetheless partners in a common enterprise. That they fight for 
more control of the sheets does not change the fact that they are 
lying in the same bed. 
                                                                                                     
status of sovereignty as a highly ambiguous concept is well established.”); 
HIDEAKI SHINODA, RE-EXAMINING SOVEREIGNTY: FROM CLASSICAL THEORY TO 
THE GLOBAL AGE 1 (2000) (“Since the end of the Cold War, academics as well as 
practitioners have identified the concept of sovereignty as one of the most critical 
and elusive topics.”). 
 388. Notwithstanding, concepts of sovereignty were discussed, at high levels 
of sophistication, at the outset of the events that led to the Revolution. See ALISON 
L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 68–104 
(2010). 
 389. U.S. CONST. pmbl.  
 390. See Erbsen, supra note 233, at 494 (describing the allocation of power in 
a federalist system). 
 391. See, e.g., id. at 510 (noting the inevitable friction between fifty 
“mini-spheres” of sovereignty).  
 392. See KAGAN, supra note 24, at 3 (identifying the United States’ reliance 
on adversarial legalism). 
 393. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodsen, 444 U.S. 286, 293 
(1980) (rooting the permissible exercise of jurisdiction in considerations of 
sovereignty). 
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Their sovereignty, such as it is, derives not from their 
international standing but from the terms of the marriage compact 
that is the Constitution.394 Every legitimate state action involves 
the assertion of a sovereignty based on the sovereign union.395 Put 
differently, while there may have been a time when New Jersey 
could have elected to be an independent sovereign, since 1788 its 
every sovereign act has been as part of a national union. That it is 
allocated areas of exclusive control within that union does not 
change the fact that, no less than the federal government, states 
have only those powers given to them or preserved under the 
Constitution, and exercise them not as independent sovereign 
states but as part of a compound republic.396  
State power may differ from federal power, and may differ 
from the power of another state, but all ultimately arise under the 
Constitution.397 The national power of the compound republic is 
expressed in different settings, and these different settings include 
state assertions of power just as much as federal assertions of 
power.398 All are expressions of the national power and sovereignty 
of the United States.399 
For the most part, the union exists not as the additive whole 
of separate and exclusive sovereignties, but as an even more 
complex brew of overlapping and often duplicative governments. 
The Court’s failure to take into account the actual nature of this 
complex sovereignty fatally handicaps its sovereignty analysis.  
D. State Sovereignty and Horizontal Federalism in the Age of 
Legal Pluralism 
It is somewhat ironic that the Supreme Court started worrying 
about jurisdictional monogamy, protecting rivalrous states from 
                                                                                                     
 394. See Erbsen, supra note 233, at 509 (noting the Constitution’s grant of 
power to the several states). 
 395. Id. 
 396. ROBERTSON, supra note 9, at 346 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 
(Alexander Hamilton or James Madison)). 
 397. See id. at 347–48 (describing areas of authority left to the states). 
 398. See id. (identifying areas of convergence). 
 399. See id. (noting that the national government and the states share 
governmental sovereignty). 
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competing assertions of power, just at that time that others 
worldwide have recognized that we live in an age of legal 
pluralism—an age where in any given space the players are subject 
to multiple formal and informal legal orders.400 The notion that a 
single sovereign would have exclusive power over its citizenry has 
never held true in the compound republic of the United States, and 
holds even less true today as globalization, the rise of non-state 
rule making bodies, and inherently non- territorial environments 
such as the internet further complicate the situation.401 
As one scholar has noted: 
[Today a] single act or actor is potentially regulated by multiple 
legal or quasi- legal regimes. Law often operates based on a 
convenient fiction that nation-states exist in autonomous, 
territorially distinct spheres and that activities therefore fall 
under the legal jurisdiction of only one regime at a time. Thus, 
traditional legal rules have tied jurisdiction to territory: a state 
could exercise complete authority within its territorial borders 
and no authority beyond it. In the twentieth century, such rules 
were loosened, but territorial location remained the principal 
touchstone for assigning legal authority. Accordingly, if one 
could spatially ground a dispute, one could most likely 
determine the legal rule that would apply.402 
In the modern world, however, the autonomous nation-state 
with exclusive sway over its territory has less purchase. 
Technological changes such as rapid movement of people and 
                                                                                                     
 400. See generally PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A 
JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW BEYOND BORDERS (2012) [hereinafter, BERMAN, GLOBAL 
LEGAL PLURALISM]; TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS (Terence C. Halliday & 
Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015); MICHAEL D. MCGINNIS, POLYCENTRICITY AND LOCAL 
PUBLIC ECONOMIES: READINGS FROM THE WORKSHOP IN POLITICAL THEORY AND 
POLICY ANALYSIS (1999); OSTROM & ALLEN, supra note 9; FRANCIS SNYDER, THE 
EU, THE WTO AND CHINA: LEGAL PLURALISM AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
REGULATION 29–88 (2010); Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 
151 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 490 (2002); Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law 
to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485 (2005); Paul Schiff 
Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining 
Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819 (2005); Robert 
M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and 
Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981); Alexandra D. Lahav, Recovering 
the Social Value of Jurisdictional Redundancy, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2369 (2008). 
 401. For a review of the literature and tracing of the development of the field, 
see Paul Schiff Berman, The New Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 
225 (2009). 
 402. BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM, supra note 400, at 4.  
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products, placeless technologies such as internet clouds and 
satellites, international treaty organizations and 
non-governmental standard setting organizations, along with 
traditional nonstate players such as religious communities, all 
play a role alongside sovereign states.  
In this world: 
[A] simple model that looks only to territorial delineations 
among official state- based legal systems is now simply 
untenable (if it was ever useful to begin 
with) . . . . [N]ation-states must work within a framework of 
multiple overlapping jurisdictional assertions by state, 
international, and even nonstate communities. Each of these 
types of overlapping jurisdictional assertions creates a 
potentially hybrid legal space that is not easily eliminated.403 
Even at the national level, legal pluralism cannot be wished 
away, and trying to protect states from insults to their sovereignty 
should another entity have some type of jurisdiction is doomed to 
failure.404 In many if not most cases, there is no single proper 
forum; in many if not most cases, states are not injured if others 
have a claim to participate.405 The proper question is whether a 
forum has sufficient connection to a dispute to legitimately 
exercise power.406 
This cannot be a question solely based on territorial lines. 
Horizontal limits are primarily a function of community rather 
than just geography.407 The question is not where geographically a 
defendant may be compelled to appear, but which communities 
should have the power to make him appear and to render 
                                                                                                     
 403. See id. at 5. 
 404. See id. at 14 (“[H]ybridity is a reality we cannot escape . . . .”). 
 405. See Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1788 
(2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (implying that states share parallel interests 
in adjudicating certain claims). 
 406. Id.  
 407. See Robert B. Ahdieh, From Federalism to Intersystemic Governance: The 
Changing Nature of Modern Jurisdiction, 57 EMORY L.J. 1, 1 (2007) 
(“[J]urisdiction entails more than territorial and formalistic inquiries into 
applicable law and the authority of a given court in a particular dispute. These 
authors have instead engaged it as a ‘locus for debates about community 
definition, sovereignty, and legitimacy.’”). 
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judgment. This is less a question of location and convenience than 
of political legitimacy.408 
Particularly when international defendants are involved, and 
when the alternative may be for a U.S. plaintiff to seek redress in 
an alien jurisdiction, it is worth remembering that that all U.S. 
states are members of the same political community. Each state 
expresses, and can only express, a facet of U.S. political power. To 
send plaintiffs altogether out of that community because of overly 
fine concerns about where internal lines might be drawn weakens 
and offends, rather than preserves, the political community 
created by “our federalism.”409 
The defendant’s ex ante “availment” and state of mind are 
unlikely to prove an exclusive guide to political legitimacy, because 
the defendant is not the only actor in the play. An unrelated 
forum—such as California would have been in the Daimler 
litigation—raises deep legitimacy issues, but a related forum that 
was not at the top of the defendant’s mind at the time crucial 
actions were taken is, in other nation-states, recognized as a 
legitimate forum.410 If a state has a regulatory or compensatory 
interest, and must live with the consequences of the defendant’s 
misconduct, it’s hard to see why the defendant’s projections about 
where its actions might have an impact should stifle further 
analysis. 
                                                                                                     
 408. See Sachs, supra note 317, at 1312 (“But we shouldn’t be surprised that 
personal jurisdiction implicates the allocation of power across nations and across 
states—or that our intuitive answers might actually depend on complex theories 
of political authority or international law.”). 
 409. See Dodge & Dodson, supra note 6, at 1229 (“[T]he burdens on the 
plaintiff of being forced to bring suit in a foreign country counterbalance any 
assertions of unfairness by an alien in having to defend in the United States.”); 
Erbsen, supra note 285, at 26 
[E]ven if the burdens of litigating in a particular forum would be severe 
for the defendant, the burdens of not litigating in that forum would 
often be equally severe for the plaintiff. Jurisdictional dismissals 
redistribute burdens rather than eliminate them: refusing to force a 
defendant to travel to the forum can force the plaintiff to travel from 
the forum. 
 410. See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro 564 U.S. 873, 909 (2011) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The European Court of Justice has interpreted this 
prescription to authorize jurisdiction either where the harmful act occurred or at 
the place of injury.” (citing Case 21/76, Handelskwekerij G.J. Bier B.V. v. Mines 
de Potasse d’Alsace S.A., 1976 E.C.R. 1735)). 
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Still more importantly, one state’s assertion of power should 
not be viewed as another state’s loss. On the ground, rather than 
existing in separate pseudo-Westphalian silos states and the 
federal government, whether one looks horizontally or vertically, 
states engage in regulatory dialogues, putting resources where 
others have not, and acting consciously or unconsciously in 
concert.411 On the ground, regulatory reality is more muddled and 
intermingled than subject to the bright lines beloved by legal 
minds.412 
In a deeply pluralistic system where national and 
international actors can expect to be regulated and held to account 
by multiple jurisdictions, and in a national system where the laws 
if not identical are least of the same legal family, Justice 
Sotomayor’s question in Bristol-Myers deserves thoughtful 
consideration: What unique interest in a litigation does a state 
have that might not be shared by others?413 In the case of 
Bristol-Myers, all states had similar interests in regulating 
identical products.414 In other cases, it may be that a state has a 
unique and special regulatory interest that it would want to 
vindicate directly. Again, however, this special regulatory interest 
is unlikely to be revealed by the defendant’s ex ante thought 
processes. 
It must be recognized that assertions of state power are 
ultimately assertions of national power—states have separate 
spheres, to be sure, but they are intertwined parts rather than 
independent free agents.415 Curtailing state power also curtails 
national power.416 Especially where foreign defendants are 
involved, shutting down a legitimate state forum limits the reach 
of national after-the-fact regulation.417 Given that most such 
litigation as regulation occurs in state, not federal, courts, and that 
                                                                                                     
 411. See Ahdieh, supra note 10, at 865–68 (discussing cooperative regulation). 
 412. See id. at 865 (“In such regimes, discrete sets of regulatory rules may 
collapse into a collective whole.”). 
 413. Bristol-Meyers, 137 S. Ct. at 1788 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 414. Id. 
 415. See BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM, supra note 400, at 4 (labeling 
the concept of states as distinct spheres a “convenient fiction”).  
 416. See, e.g., Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 873 (Kennedy, J., plurality) (foreclosing 
reach of domestic courts in exercising jurisdiction over a foreign defendant). 
 417. Id. 
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states are entitled to assert such regulatory power, cutting off state 
power to adjudicate must be recognized as the insult to national 
sovereignty that it is.418 
IV. Conclusion 
State sovereignty ultimately is national sovereignty. To 
exaggerate concepts of state exclusiveness in a modern age of legal 
pluralism serves only to diminish the sovereignty of individual 
states, and, ultimately, the nation as a whole by constricting how 
legitimate U.S. regulatory power can be exercised through 
litigatory regulation. 
Texas and Massachusetts, however different they are, are 
more like each other than either is like China. Massachusetts is 
not Scandinavia; Texas is not Chile. While there are fiercely 
contested intramural differences, and while contesting those 
intramural differences has consequences both locally and in terms 
of national development,419 paying due regard to differences should 
not lead to ignoring the profound commonalities amongst states 
bound together in one union and one political community. 
The problem comes into sharper focus when the defendant is 
an alien. Requiring an alien to target an individual state, rather 
than the nation as a whole, leaves the U.S. with a narrower 
jurisdictional reach than other countries, and risks driving U.S. 
citizens to a foreign jurisdiction to seek redress. The loss of 
sovereignty is that of the United States as a nation. 
                                                                                                     
 418. Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 
22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 608 (1981) (discussing the ways in which the 
Constitution channels the adjudication of federal questions to state courts).  
 419. See ROBERTSON, supra note 9, at 348 (“[M]ost of the contentious policy 
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government.”). 
